French football association (FFF) presid

Yesterday there was a brief bit of Twitter drama over a hockey analyst who deleted an archived post because it included a prediction about the surefire future failure of a particular goaltender, one that later proved to be false.

Before we get into this discussion in a soccer analytics context, anyone who lends their by-line to a published opinion about sports runs the risk of being wrong from time to time (or a lot if they’re not very good). There are a number of ways a writer can address their past mistakes. Here are four:

1. Ingore them. Simply pretend you never wrote the article in question that asserted Andre Villas-Boas career at Spurs would end in tears before the season’s finish as the club faces relegation. If you write for an old-timey newspaper hidden behind a pay-wall, this is much easier to do. If your work appears on-line, you’ll just have to tough it out for a while as commenters call into question your authority to speak on any sporting subject because, you know, you were wrong once.

2. Admit you made a mistake in your prediction, but reverse engineer several mitigating circumstances that determined the eventual outcome. Perhaps in your original article on AVB, you assumed the club wouldn’t have had the transfer budget it in August, or that a particular player would stay instead of leave. You’ll take the hit perhaps for not taking these factors into consideration in the first place, but you can at least salvage the illusion that you’re somehow never flat out wrong on occasion.

3. Delete previous instances in which you were wrong. In the digital age, why bother with accountability? Chances are no one will notice if you erase that pesky AVB prediction from a few months back. Your precious “expertise” remains intact, at least until someone catches you in the act, in which all of your credibility goes down the toilet, possibly forever.

4. Embrace your mistakes. Look to see where your prediction failed, and publicly discuss possible reasons why. Don’t be afraid to pose questions rather than pound out an entirely new set of answers. Use your prediction error as an opportunity to further refine your approach, to learn something new about the sport about which you thought you knew everything.

These options, you’ll note, aren’t simply available to all sports writers across the board. Some analysts, for example, write in such a way as to make option four impossible. This is the writer who stakes their entire career on being a capital ‘E’ expert. They work to convince their readers that they are where they are (and are paid what they’re paid) because their opinions on sports are invaluable, better than the myriad opinions of others. They’ll argue they either have a level of education or experience in the game that sets them apart.

The sportswriter-as-infallible-expert model worked well in the age of newspapers, a time when there was little accountability for the sports opinion writer beyond the angry glare of an editor or editors, in addition to tremendous pressure to shore up bona fides to the public to answer the implied question that dogs all staff writers in a competitive field: “Why is this guy and not someone else?”

The newspaper format didn’t help either. Daily single edition publications received through paid subscriptions aren’t exactly amenable to expressions of doubt or uncertainty, let alone regular follow-ups on a single topic, collaborative projects with several writers, or long-winded discussions within a frequently updated comments section.

In the age of papers, most readers would likely forget whatever a columnist predicted about something by the time the results came in to hold them accountable. There were no easily searchable newspaper archives, let alone a section in which a reader could gripe without having to write a letter in the hopes a kind editor would publish the dissent a day or days after the fact. While some writers established their writerly authoriteh with gorgeous prose, others shored up their credibility with the strength of their convictions.

The writing style of sports “expertism” has certainly carried over to the digital age, but today the writer can no longer post what they like and then hide behind the walls of their publication. Writers are now hounded continuously on comment pages or on Twitter by readers looking for ways to show them just how wrong they are. Often these confrontations devolve into name-calling or references to comparative numbers of ‘followers,’ but increasingly a fair number of sports columnists regularly engage in lively conversation with readers and other writers, which certainly isn’t a bad thing.

It’s about here where readers of this column are wondering where the bit about analytics comes in.

One the major criticisms of soccer analytics right now is the sense that analysts believe they know something the rest of the football-loving public doesn’t. Not only that, but this knowledge sets them high above the great unwashed football fan. In other words, they’re simply a newer brand of sports expert whose grasp of statistical science provides a shield from criticism.

Andi Thomas spoke to this a little in his lip-smackingly good review of Chris Anderson & David Sally’s new book, The Numbers Game:

From the ordinary fan point of view, the wider question is more-or-less moot: if you like systems, and analysis, and figuring out how things works, then this book will fit neatly into the burgeoning library of online and offline writings, and you’ll enjoy it. If you don’t, then you can safely ignore it without missing too much. As illuminating as much of this is, anybody nursing the idea that greater acceptance of analytics into the mainstream will put an end to people saying and believing incorrect things about football is being naive. Perhaps a few cliches will die a death, perhaps one or two columnists will set aside some established truths, but the broad sweep of footballing chitter-chat will retain its fundamental character, and be defined by plenty more than just the vitally-important-yet-terribly-reductive question of who is and isn’t any good.

I haven’t yet read the book, so I can’t speak to Thomas’ specific criticisms. But I think his point about tempering some of the more evangelical fire of analytics-thumpers (like yours truly) is a good one, if perhaps a little misguided.

I’m not sure that most analysts, amateur or otherwise, care as much about receiving widespread public ‘acceptance’ from those who otherwise don’t give a toss as they do in countering a few angry critics who claim, repeatedly and with no convincing evidence, that soccer analytics is simply a waste of time.

There are of course several hills on which soccer analysts would readily die, particularly those that involve warning against extrapolating general claims from single, ninety minute games. Thomas of course right in asserting that these dissenting voices on conventional football punditry aren’t limited to the PDO set. There is an entire cottage industry of angry young men and women who continue to shake their fist at lazy cliches and from-on-high footballing opinions shored up with grandiose self-regard (Joe Kinnear) and abusive shouting (Joe Kinnear). They don’t need a spreadsheet to know that Lawro’s predictions are wrong all the time.

The problem is this set has been ranting and railing against the BBC and Lawro and all the rest for decades now, stretching all the way back to the first issue of When Saturday Comes and even before that, to no avail. Football discourse has been locked in thesis/anti-thesis with no end in sight.

Perhaps everyone involved prefers it this way. Just as the fan will use his own eyes and ears to give his or her opinion on the general worth of Charlie Adam to anyone who will listen because it’s fun to talk about football, so too might the iconoclast football writer enjoy using a torrent of sarcasm in alternative publications/websites to demolish the tired cliches of Motson, Lineker and the rest because it’s fun to write angry.

I think the analytics community (at least the one I’m aware of) isn’t really in on the joke. They take football’s questions seriously (in so far as they think they’re worth exploring), and believe there may be answers beyond the subjective ravings of some guy in the paper. And, as with anyone looking to earnestly find an answer, they tend to begin by admitting their uncertainty, in first finding the right questions before rushing headlong into an answer.

In fact, good analytics trades in doubt. Few analysts of any worth that I know of would go to the wall for their predictive models; many of the best analysts view errors as a godsend, a means to make adjustments, learn more, collaborate more, improve. Errors are part of a process, rather than dents in credibility.

Yesterday I read Malcolm Gladwell’s review of Jeremy Alderman’s book on the extraordinary economist Albert O. Hirschman. Gladwell quotes a passage from the book on Hirschman’s mentor and friend Eugenio Colorni that nearly got me out of my bed, fist pumping to the ceiling.

Colorni believed that doubt was creative because it allowed for alternative ways to see the world, and seeing alternatives could steer people out of intractable circles and self-feeding despondency. Doubt, in fact, could motivate: freedom from ideological constraints opened up political strategies, and accepting the limits of what one could know liberated agents from their dependence on the belief that one had to know everything before acting, that conviction was a precondition for action.

Doubt, uncertainty, awareness of the limits of knowledge and acceptance failure are not the dead ends that the sports experts once stridently believed them to be, but often the seeds necessary to grow beyond the simple binary of thesis/anti-thesis and into synthesis.

To those within and without, the current analytics community has often resembled a classic internet circle-jerk. Yet a closer look shows a lot of consensus on some issues with rough dissent on others, almost always expressed publicly and without reservation. “Your sample size is much too small to reach that conclusion.” “There isn’t enough evidence to make that kind of claim.” “The shots on target data collected here isn’t very reliable,” etc. etc. In my limited experience, these criticisms lead to amendments, follow-up posts, corrections, and no doubt some hurt pride. But everyone knows that the public nature of football analytics writing prevents anyone from trudging out into the public realm making absolute claims without the benefit of solid evidence. An analyst is only as good as their process, not the stridency of their claims that they’re right.

Some writers perceive the skepticism of the analytics community over whether there are such things as good finishers or scoring streaks as a dig or an insult, a smug assertion of some greater knowledge of the game bestowed by a specialized science. And indeed, many analytics writers no doubt take great pleasure from exploding the “scoreboard journalism” that has dominated soccer writing for so long. But I don’t know of any who would claim that knowledge of analytics is a precursor to enjoyment of football (as daft a claim as anyone could make). Analytics writers are just as harsh on each other or themselves as they are on the self-proclaimed experts. They just don’t think that accepting lazy-half truths about soccer just because it’s a game and all in good fun is an adequate reason not to peel back its layers, to learn what makes it tick, to find new ways to enjoy the beautiful simplicity of the simplest game.

Newcastle United v Arsenal - Premier League

The Lead

Newcastle United earned £93 million in revenue the 2011/12 Premier League season, the 7th highest in the league. The year before they’d spent a not inconsiderable £27 million on transfer fees, which, as you know, are amortized and so still on the books. Wages totalled £64 million as well. With the club posting a £1 million profit last season, the margins are quite tight. Mike Ashley has already loaned himself £129 million, and the club continues to seek ways to expand its commercial revenues under managing director Derek Llambas.

Once could easily see a need here for a director of football, but only if the person filling that role had a considerable track record of responsible spending, intelligent and cost-effective allocation of resources, and a good sense of areas of the player market that have yet to be fully explored as a source of Premier League-ready talent.

I don’t know for certain Joe Kinnear isn’t that man. But I’m pretty damn sure he’s not. In any case, his train wreck interview with talkSPORT yesterday revealed a man who may not have a grasp on things that actually happened in real life. From the Guardian:

On Monday evening Kinnear gave a shambolic interview to Talksport in which the former Wimbledon manager claimed responsibility for signing Tim Krul [a goalkeeper recruited by Graeme Souness] as well as James Perch [bought by Chris Hughton], said Derek Llambezee [Llambias] had resigned as director of football [a position he has never held] and talked about Shola Amenobee, Yohan Kebab and Hatem Ben Afre rather than Shola Ameobi, Yohan Cabaye and Hatem Ben Arfa.

It’s certainly possible that Joe Kinnear’s David Brent-like public deportment may not reflect on his abilities as a future director of football. But if a company were interviewing for a position that involved the oversight of spending tens of millions of pounds on acquisitions vital to the future well-being of the business, and that person claimed the accomplishments of other persons as their own in a public forum mere hours after hiring them, one would hope that company would see the error of their ways and restart the process, whilst at the same apologizing for failing to do due diligence on such a crucial hire.

But this is Newcastle. When I first read Louise Taylor’s thesis on how Kinnear got hired–Mike Ashley didn’t like how Alan Pardew ‘shared the blame’ for Newcastle’s struggles last season with the owner, and so hired a director of football as revenge–it struck me as journalistic speculomasturbation in the extreme. Now I’m not so sure. The Premier League, despite any claims that gobs of money somehow equal sophistication, slouches toward television to be born and reborn over and over again, in spite of itself.
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Sunderland v Newcastle United - Premier League

We were warned.

Simon Kuper and Stefan Szymanksi’s book Soccernomics gave us some candid insight into football’s quirks and idiosyncrasies (mostly) off the pitch, including its notorious conservatism. One of the more memorable passages noted how several elite clubs still didn’t pay attention to small but vital details, like helping overseas players settle in quickly in their new locations as a means to facilitate their transition to a new team.

Many of us believe that in sports as in business, money naturally seeks out efficiency. After all, despite the enormous influence in luck in determining the success of one company over another in a particular market, success is also driven in large part from smart planning, good product development, and an intense focus on cost control.

So when we hear that the Premier League is the wealthiest football league in the world, we assume this is in part because its member clubs have been adept at exploiting all avenues of commercial revenue, retail and gate sales, and acquiring low-cost, high impact players. Clearly to be so rich, they must have been doing something right.

Except that football is not a conventional business. For one, the clubs aren’t selling a product; they’re playing football in a league. To that end, the Barclays Premier League proper has done some incredible work in negotiating on behalf of its member clubs its astronomical rights deal. Whatever you think of Richard Scudamore, the league has arguably been very good at exploiting its international popularity to the fullest extent possible.

So good in fact that of the 18 Premier League clubs that posted a breakdown of revenue by category for the 2011/12 season, 14 earned the bulk of their revenue from TV and broadcasting rights. Of those clubs, 12 earned more money in TV rights fees than all other revenue sources combined. I hope they all give Scudamore a nice bottle of single malt at Christmas.

To reiterate, this is money the clubs received from an agreed upon base/merit pay breakdown for a broadcast deal they didn’t play much of an active role in negotiating. The clubs did not market anything, employ any talent, develop any innovative business strategies to earn this revenue. It was simply handed to them by virtue of being in the top flight.

If you believe (as I do) that football is not a business in the conventional sense, there’s nothing really wrong with this. Clubs, after all, have historically existed to win football matches, not negotiate lucrative overseas commercial partnerships to maximize alternative revenue streams. Once upon a time, it was the job of the chairman who oversaw the club to ensure that it spend money wisely on good players and find a good manager who didn’t expect the boss to sign blank cheques on players. That most clubs “earned” the TV rights deal by staying in the PL should be good enough.

The problem is today the cost of maintaining a competitive Premier League first team skyrocketing. In fact, it’s nearing or has reached a competitive ceiling. Spending-to-win isn’t good enough for the vast majority of teams who aren’t bankrolled by infinitely deep-pocketed investors; in fact, it’s barely good enough for the tiny collection of teams “lucky” enough to be in that category.

Despite this, how these enormous TV rights revenues are spent is still in large part overseen by football coaches or football directors who know little more than how to get a player, an agent and a club representative in a room together at the same time. Newcastle’s bizarre decision to appoint Joe Kinnear as “director of football” is evidence that English football clubs may not be getting much smarter in how they address the crucial question of how to build a winning football club.

This is Kinnear’s role, in his own words (from the Guardian):

Asked who would have the final say on transfers, Kinnear said: “It’ll be me. What I’m saying is, between me, Alan [Pardew] and Graham [Carr, the chief scout], we’ll sit down and iron it out. If those two decide a player we’re looking at is not good enough, my ears will be wide open. It’s not a case of ‘like it or lump it’. If a close decision is to be made, though, and we’re running out of time and it’s something we have to do, whether that’s adding meat or beef to the team, or pace in wide areas, or someone who can guarantee us 20 goals a season, I will buy those players. I will take that chance once I’ve clarified that with Alan, that this is for the good of Newcastle.

“I’ll assess the transfer kitty with Mike next week once I’ve sat down with Alan first, find out what is wanted, who can be shifted out of the club – maybe we can get money back if we shift four or five of them – and then look at the targets.”

“…adding meat or beef to the team, or pace in wide areas, or someone who can guarantee us 20 goals a season.” No doubt the person to decide which players fit these depressing cliches will be Kinnear in consultation with Graham Carr (no word if Newcastle’s performance analyst Ben Stevens will play a role). This is an enormous amount of trust in one person for such a crucial undertaking. And Kinnear didn’t say anything about reevaluating the team’s overall approach to player development and recruitment, or first-to-market buying strategies that marked the club’s “French revolution” under Pardew.

None of this will come as a surprise to seasoned football supporters. But it does challenge the implied assumption made by opponents of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play’s break-even requirements for example that clubs have already explored all avenues in building a winning side beyond simply dumping more money than god into the transfer market.

It’s true that clubs like West Brom and Swansea will likely never be able to come close to securing the enormous commercial revenues of teams like Manchester United and Chelsea (although it’s not at all clear some of these clubs are doing enough to grow revenue in these areas). But I’m yet to be convinced that English or continental clubs have fully explored all options in ways to build a winning side beyond breaking the bank in costly transfers for so-called “proven” talent that proves to be anything but.

Malaga CF v Borussia Dortmund - UEFA Champions League Quarter Final

Sitting in the dressing room after a game against Cobreandino in 1986, the Universidad de Chile defender Manuel Pellegrini came to a decision. After over a decade with the club and no one else, he felt it was time to hang up his boots and retire from playing. His mind had been made up by Bam Bam no less. Not the club-wielding child with superhuman strength from the Flintstones (that would just be silly). Rather the young striker nicknamed after him, hailed as football’s equivalent. “I decided to stop,” he recalled to La Gazzetta dello Sport’s Filippo Maria Ricci prior to Malaga’s game against Milan last October, “when an 18-year-old kid, who was shorter than me, towered over me and scored a header. He was called Iván Zamorano.”

Bam Bam would go on to become one of the best strikers of his generation anywhere in the world. Pellegrini didn’t know that at the time. How he chose to see it instead was that a kid had just shown him up, making him feel his age. And yet Pellegrini was only 33. Upon reflection it wasn’t that he was past it, more that Zamorano was simply a better jumper. “If I’d been able to look into the future I would have played another year,” Pellegrini admitted to the pink paper.

Alas he didn’t. And so Pellegrini arrived at a crossroads in his life. What was he going to do next? He didn’t lack options. As his sister recalled, growing up, “He was very good at maths and chess.” While playing, Pellegrini attended the Universidad Católica and graduated as a civil engineer at 26. To this day he is often referred to as the ingeniero. His wish, though, was to become an entrenador.

Brought up in a well-educated, well-to-do family, Pellegrini’s late father, who passed away before the second leg of Málaga’s Champions League quarter-final against Borussia Dortmund in April, was wary. “He told me I’d die poor,” remembered Pellegrini. Not to be discouraged legend has it, he replied: “One day I’ll coach Real Madrid.” It would take over two decades but he’d do it. In the meantime, he had to start somewhere.

Towards the end of his playing days, Pellegrini travelled to Italy, where his grandfather hailed from, and headed for Coverciano, the country’s elite coaching school. Unable to take the famous super corso, which at the time was only open to Italians, Pellegrini could only observe but, as a formative experience, many of the things he saw there would stay with him.

His first job was back at Universidad de Chile. Things didn’t go as hoped. They were relegated for the first and only time in their history. Pellegrini resigned and started over with Palestino and O’Higgins before landing the post at Universidad Católica where he first tasted success as a coach, winning the Copa Chile. Runners’ up in his first season, Pellegrini was sacked during his second as the team fell nine points behind eventual winners’ Colo Colo.

Another spell at Palestino beckoned before leaving Chile to work abroad. Glory was to be found in Ecuador where Pellegrini claimed the league title with Liga de Quito, and in Argentina at San Lorenzo. There he put together a record breaking run of 13 straight wins and an unprecedented total of 47 points to take the Torneo Clausura. Flamengo, incidentally, were also beaten on penalties in the final of the Copa Mercasur.

On the back of his achievements in Boedo, Pellegrini was appointed by River Plate. He had the difficult job of replacing Ramón Díaz. To say it was a tall order is an understatement. Díaz had led River to every trophy there was to win: the Apertura on three occasions, the Clausura twice and the Copa Libertadores once. Many would have shirked the challenge. But not Pellegrini. He felt ready for it.

And so even with a young team featuring the fledgling Martín Demichelis, who he’d later sign for Málaga, Andrés D’Alessandro, subsequently of Portsmouth, and Fernando Cavenaghi, Pellegrini conjured another Clausura-winning outfit. River were top scorers and finished four points ahead of rivals Boca. Old favourites Marcelo Salas and Marcelo Gallardo were then brought back for the following Apertura and more kids, like Javier Mascherano and Maxí Lopez, came through. But an eighth place finish and a defeat to the relative unknown Cienciano of Peru in the final of the Copa Sudamericana 4-3 on aggregate heralded the end of Pellegrini’s time at the Centenario.

Impressed by what they’d seen and heard about him, Villarreal offered a chance to work in Europe. Promoted to La Liga in 1998 for the first time in the small town’s history, they’d gone straight back down, bounced back, were guided to seventh by Víctor Muñoz and then spent the next two seasons in a dangerous liaison with relegation before rising up to eighth again under Benito Floro.

The team Pellegrini inherited comprised Pepe Reina and of course Juan Román Riquelme. Added to it were Gonzalo Rodríguez, Juan Pablo Sorín and Diego Forlán, who replaced the veteran Sonny Anderson. In Pellegrini’s first season Villarreal won the Intertoto Cup, came third in La Liga and Forlán, who had been thought of as a flop at previous club Manchester United, was named the Pichichi, scoring 25 goals.

They qualified for the Champions League for the first time ever after knocking out Everton, managed by David Moyes, in the third preliminary round, then topped a group including his future club Manchester United, who, after only drawing 0-0 with Villarreal at El Madrigal and Old Trafford, finished bottom and were eliminated. Next Rangers were edged out on away goals in the Round of 16. So too were Inter, coached by Pellegrini’s predecessor at Manchester City Roberto Mancini, in the quarter-final.

It was fairytale stuff. Until, that is, the last minute of their semi-final second leg against Arsenal. Trailing by a goal to nil on aggregate, Gael Clichy, a player Pellegrini will be working with at the Etihad, pushed Jose Marí and gave away a penalty. Riquelme had a chance to level things from the spot. But Jens Lehmann saved his effort and clinched a place in the final for Arsenal.

It wasn’t the end for Villarreal. The miracles didn’t stop there. Those who thought they were worked by Riquelme were wrong. Their success was down to Pellegrini and a club with “the ideal model, an example in every respect,” he’d later tell El País’ Rafael Pineda. So when Riquelme returned late from his holidays, went AWOL, didn’t fancy it in training, complained of “injuries” and tried to pick which games he played, Villarreal backed the manager in dropping him, then got rid and were still successful without him. In 2008 they were runners’ up behind Real Madrid.

When Florentino Perez returned as president for a second term and entrusted his technical director, the great football aesthete Jorge Valdano, with finding a suitable candidate to replace caretaker Juande Ramos, he picked Pellegrini. He might not have been a big name. He still isn’t to some. But in so many respects Pellegrini was the right man for that job.

Valdano saw that. Elegant, polite, dignified, Pellegrini shared, understood and perhaps cared more about respecting and honoring Real’s values and traditions than his successor José Mourinho did. Perez didn’t see it, however. He had apparently wanted Arsene Wenger and had to be persuaded to appoint Pellegrini.

As such, the political support a new manager needs most in the White House wasn’t bequeathed to him, nor did he ever enjoy or attempt to wrestle for himself influence from others like Mourinho would do. Take transfers, for instance.

Since getting the City job one of the criticisms laid at Pellegrini’s door by an element of the English media is that in the year he was at the Bernabeu he spent 254m euro on Kaka, Cristiano Ronaldo, Karim Benzema, Xabi Alonso and several others and yet won nothing. To think he personally spent that money is terribly naive. It was Perez ushering in his second Galacticos era.

Pellegrini presumably wouldn’t have said ‘no’ to any of those players. But even so the one actual demand he did make—namely that Wesley Sneijder and Arjen Robben remain at the club—went unheeded. Both were sold and would go on to reach the Champions League final with their respective new clubs that season.

Revealing he hadn’t been listened to at the beginning of the campaign didn’t help things with Perez. When the Madrid press attacked Pellegrini, no one came out to defend him. Those attacks became greater in number and ever more disgraceful after Real were hammered 4-0 in the first leg of their Copa del Rey tie with Alcorcón from Spain’s Second Division B, Group II, then their elimination in the Champions League Round of 16 by Lyon and finally the 2-0 defeat they suffered to Pep Guardiola’s Barcelona at the Bernabeu.

Those results, particularly the first two, were costly exceptions to an otherwise more than decent season. Real finished with a club record 96 points even though they’d had to do without Ronaldo for more than two months and Pepe for six. The only issue was that Barça, and not just any Barça either, but arguably the greatest team of all-time, ended on 99 and Perez, after watching Mourinho knock them out of the Champions League with Inter, threw in his lot with him, a move seen by some to be desperate, a pact with the devil.

Being told where the door is by Real certainly under Perez shouldn’t necessarily reflect badly on a manager as even Mourinho would now like to make us believe now. This, remember, is the same president who fired Vicente del Bosque, a future World Cup and European Championship winner, after he’d delivered two league titles and two Champions League trophies in four years.

Pellegrini more than restored his reputation at Málaga, again taking a club to hitherto unknown heights: fourth place and qualification for the Champions League in his first full season then in spite of financial turmoil and the sale of many of their best players a remarkable run to the quarter-finals of that competition where they were only seconds away from knocking out Dortmund and making the last four.

Pellegrini has consistently overachieved in that tournament with teams around whom there is little or no expectation. He now joins one in City who have underachieved in it. Although expectations are high (and understandably so because of the money they’ve spent), there’s still, you feel, a sense that City are European outsiders, something that wasn’t the case when Pellegrini was with Real who are the establishment and are always among the favourites.

Winning the Champions League—and everything else—is the aim for City and while the pressure to see progress will be on, the trophy seems more of an aspiration and less of an all-consuming obsession to them than landing the 10th is to Real. Contending for such prestigious honors is still something relatively new to the more recent generations of City fans. They’re still grateful for it and are yet to act like spoiled children. While he obviously replaces the popular Mancini, Pellegrini should benefit from that mentality.

The backing of an ambitious but fair-minded rational owner and the presence of Txiki Begiristain and Ferran Soriano, directors who have faith in Pellegrini, who share the same vision of how football should be played certainly bodes well. While Pellegrini’s quiet authority might well contrast with City’s noisy neighbour tag, the lowering of the tones foreshadows a heightened competitiveness. It’s hard to think that they won’t be better next season. Pellegrini just might be the man to take the title back from United.

Spain v Uruguay: Group B - FIFA Confederations Cup Brazil 2013

The Lead

The Confederations Cup was once a bona fide friendly tournament. How do I know this? Because, as with all the world’s leading friendly tournaments, it was first organized by a Middle East nation to provide entertainment in the off-season. Called the King Fahd Cup, it was first played in October 1992, with four representative FIFA confederation tournament winners travelling to Saudi Arabia to participate (Argentina beat Saudi Arabia in the final 3-1 with Caniggia bagging the winner).

FIFA, perhaps sensing another sure fire way of cramming the football calendar with more footballing goodness, took over the tournament in 1997. It was played every two years until 2005 when FIFA smartly decided to use it as a World Cup tune-up tourney to take place in the host nation, a lucrative way to keep everyone on schedule in their prep for the Big Show while at the same time providing the world with yet another international tournament.

Still, for a short time nobody was fooled. It was a dress rehearsal. Not one without its moments, mind you. But only the most overworked commentators would have scrutinized every kick of the ball, drawing tortured causal latices to the next year’s World Cup.

No longer. Whether because of doubts over Brazil’s readiness on and off the pitch, or the North American-friendly kick off times, or because of the insatiable 24/7 football media machine which needs more and more football fuel to keep chugging along, the Confed Cup is now a thing. It has its own stub at whoscored.com. It is the subject of a host of analyses on ESPNFC. And most telling of all, it has its own Guardian Football Weekly dedicated podcast.

It seems the public shares this interest. As Roger Pielke Jr. notes:

While I’m partial to the idea that there are several distinguishing factors that make this instance special (including the fact Brazil are the hosts), I generally think this is also a case of television’s insatiable desire for more product. Conventional TV is bleeding profit as many viewers are dispersed in a cable universe that is itself under increasing threat of “cord cutting”–dropping cable altogether in favour of live-streaming services like Netflix.

Sports however, which are played live in real time and look gorgeous in high definition of the kind only TV can provide (for now), are still TV’s safest bet. But in order to capture and keep as many viewers as possible, TV needs a lot of sports to justify the increasing cost of event rights. Hence the incredible interest in the UEFA U21 tournament this time around, and now the Confed Cup. No doubt football fans are delighted with all this intense coverage, but the reality is now there is no off-season in soccer. Football is a year-round sport, and all of it is important with a capital ‘I.’

The problem is however is that sooner or later, if all televised football is must-see, essential viewing, then none of it is. Will all this exposure dilute the product? Maybe not. The Champions League has long been accused of being bloated beyond recognition, but it’s still among the most entertaining sports events in the world. Still, one yearns for the time when the Confed Cup was a silly lark in which we could watch the USA beat Spain in a semifinal in South Africa, all the while knowing it was ultimately meaningless.

Mario Balotelli scored the winner for Italy, who beat Mexico 2-1 in Brazil. Here is the goal that did it. Always him. Always Mario.


That is the least surprising thing I’ve ever read.


Not much else to say about this but wow. Andrea Pirlo became the fifth player to record 100 caps for Italy today. He marked the occasion by reminding us just how good he really is. Bellissimo.