Richard Whittall

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French football association (FFF) presid

Yesterday there was a brief bit of Twitter drama over a hockey analyst who deleted an archived post because it included a prediction about the surefire future failure of a particular goaltender, one that later proved to be false.

Before we get into this discussion in a soccer analytics context, anyone who lends their by-line to a published opinion about sports runs the risk of being wrong from time to time (or a lot if they’re not very good). There are a number of ways a writer can address their past mistakes. Here are four:

1. Ingore them. Simply pretend you never wrote the article in question that asserted Andre Villas-Boas career at Spurs would end in tears before the season’s finish as the club faces relegation. If you write for an old-timey newspaper hidden behind a pay-wall, this is much easier to do. If your work appears on-line, you’ll just have to tough it out for a while as commenters call into question your authority to speak on any sporting subject because, you know, you were wrong once.

2. Admit you made a mistake in your prediction, but reverse engineer several mitigating circumstances that determined the eventual outcome. Perhaps in your original article on AVB, you assumed the club wouldn’t have had the transfer budget it in August, or that a particular player would stay instead of leave. You’ll take the hit perhaps for not taking these factors into consideration in the first place, but you can at least salvage the illusion that you’re somehow never flat out wrong on occasion.

3. Delete previous instances in which you were wrong. In the digital age, why bother with accountability? Chances are no one will notice if you erase that pesky AVB prediction from a few months back. Your precious “expertise” remains intact, at least until someone catches you in the act, in which all of your credibility goes down the toilet, possibly forever.

4. Embrace your mistakes. Look to see where your prediction failed, and publicly discuss possible reasons why. Don’t be afraid to pose questions rather than pound out an entirely new set of answers. Use your prediction error as an opportunity to further refine your approach, to learn something new about the sport about which you thought you knew everything.

These options, you’ll note, aren’t simply available to all sports writers across the board. Some analysts, for example, write in such a way as to make option four impossible. This is the writer who stakes their entire career on being a capital ‘E’ expert. They work to convince their readers that they are where they are (and are paid what they’re paid) because their opinions on sports are invaluable, better than the myriad opinions of others. They’ll argue they either have a level of education or experience in the game that sets them apart.

The sportswriter-as-infallible-expert model worked well in the age of newspapers, a time when there was little accountability for the sports opinion writer beyond the angry glare of an editor or editors, in addition to tremendous pressure to shore up bona fides to the public to answer the implied question that dogs all staff writers in a competitive field: “Why is this guy and not someone else?”

The newspaper format didn’t help either. Daily single edition publications received through paid subscriptions aren’t exactly amenable to expressions of doubt or uncertainty, let alone regular follow-ups on a single topic, collaborative projects with several writers, or long-winded discussions within a frequently updated comments section.

In the age of papers, most readers would likely forget whatever a columnist predicted about something by the time the results came in to hold them accountable. There were no easily searchable newspaper archives, let alone a section in which a reader could gripe without having to write a letter in the hopes a kind editor would publish the dissent a day or days after the fact. While some writers established their writerly authoriteh with gorgeous prose, others shored up their credibility with the strength of their convictions.

The writing style of sports “expertism” has certainly carried over to the digital age, but today the writer can no longer post what they like and then hide behind the walls of their publication. Writers are now hounded continuously on comment pages or on Twitter by readers looking for ways to show them just how wrong they are. Often these confrontations devolve into name-calling or references to comparative numbers of ‘followers,’ but increasingly a fair number of sports columnists regularly engage in lively conversation with readers and other writers, which certainly isn’t a bad thing.

It’s about here where readers of this column are wondering where the bit about analytics comes in.

One the major criticisms of soccer analytics right now is the sense that analysts believe they know something the rest of the football-loving public doesn’t. Not only that, but this knowledge sets them high above the great unwashed football fan. In other words, they’re simply a newer brand of sports expert whose grasp of statistical science provides a shield from criticism.

Andi Thomas spoke to this a little in his lip-smackingly good review of Chris Anderson & David Sally’s new book, The Numbers Game:

From the ordinary fan point of view, the wider question is more-or-less moot: if you like systems, and analysis, and figuring out how things works, then this book will fit neatly into the burgeoning library of online and offline writings, and you’ll enjoy it. If you don’t, then you can safely ignore it without missing too much. As illuminating as much of this is, anybody nursing the idea that greater acceptance of analytics into the mainstream will put an end to people saying and believing incorrect things about football is being naive. Perhaps a few cliches will die a death, perhaps one or two columnists will set aside some established truths, but the broad sweep of footballing chitter-chat will retain its fundamental character, and be defined by plenty more than just the vitally-important-yet-terribly-reductive question of who is and isn’t any good.

I haven’t yet read the book, so I can’t speak to Thomas’ specific criticisms. But I think his point about tempering some of the more evangelical fire of analytics-thumpers (like yours truly) is a good one, if perhaps a little misguided.

I’m not sure that most analysts, amateur or otherwise, care as much about receiving widespread public ‘acceptance’ from those who otherwise don’t give a toss as they do in countering a few angry critics who claim, repeatedly and with no convincing evidence, that soccer analytics is simply a waste of time.

There are of course several hills on which soccer analysts would readily die, particularly those that involve warning against extrapolating general claims from single, ninety minute games. Thomas of course right in asserting that these dissenting voices on conventional football punditry aren’t limited to the PDO set. There is an entire cottage industry of angry young men and women who continue to shake their fist at lazy cliches and from-on-high footballing opinions shored up with grandiose self-regard (Joe Kinnear) and abusive shouting (Joe Kinnear). They don’t need a spreadsheet to know that Lawro’s predictions are wrong all the time.

The problem is this set has been ranting and railing against the BBC and Lawro and all the rest for decades now, stretching all the way back to the first issue of When Saturday Comes and even before that, to no avail. Football discourse has been locked in thesis/anti-thesis with no end in sight.

Perhaps everyone involved prefers it this way. Just as the fan will use his own eyes and ears to give his or her opinion on the general worth of Charlie Adam to anyone who will listen because it’s fun to talk about football, so too might the iconoclast football writer enjoy using a torrent of sarcasm in alternative publications/websites to demolish the tired cliches of Motson, Lineker and the rest because it’s fun to write angry.

I think the analytics community (at least the one I’m aware of) isn’t really in on the joke. They take football’s questions seriously (in so far as they think they’re worth exploring), and believe there may be answers beyond the subjective ravings of some guy in the paper. And, as with anyone looking to earnestly find an answer, they tend to begin by admitting their uncertainty, in first finding the right questions before rushing headlong into an answer.

In fact, good analytics trades in doubt. Few analysts of any worth that I know of would go to the wall for their predictive models; many of the best analysts view errors as a godsend, a means to make adjustments, learn more, collaborate more, improve. Errors are part of a process, rather than dents in credibility.

Yesterday I read Malcolm Gladwell’s review of Jeremy Alderman’s book on the extraordinary economist Albert O. Hirschman. Gladwell quotes a passage from the book on Hirschman’s mentor and friend Eugenio Colorni that nearly got me out of my bed, fist pumping to the ceiling.

Colorni believed that doubt was creative because it allowed for alternative ways to see the world, and seeing alternatives could steer people out of intractable circles and self-feeding despondency. Doubt, in fact, could motivate: freedom from ideological constraints opened up political strategies, and accepting the limits of what one could know liberated agents from their dependence on the belief that one had to know everything before acting, that conviction was a precondition for action.

Doubt, uncertainty, awareness of the limits of knowledge and acceptance failure are not the dead ends that the sports experts once stridently believed them to be, but often the seeds necessary to grow beyond the simple binary of thesis/anti-thesis and into synthesis.

To those within and without, the current analytics community has often resembled a classic internet circle-jerk. Yet a closer look shows a lot of consensus on some issues with rough dissent on others, almost always expressed publicly and without reservation. “Your sample size is much too small to reach that conclusion.” “There isn’t enough evidence to make that kind of claim.” “The shots on target data collected here isn’t very reliable,” etc. etc. In my limited experience, these criticisms lead to amendments, follow-up posts, corrections, and no doubt some hurt pride. But everyone knows that the public nature of football analytics writing prevents anyone from trudging out into the public realm making absolute claims without the benefit of solid evidence. An analyst is only as good as their process, not the stridency of their claims that they’re right.

Some writers perceive the skepticism of the analytics community over whether there are such things as good finishers or scoring streaks as a dig or an insult, a smug assertion of some greater knowledge of the game bestowed by a specialized science. And indeed, many analytics writers no doubt take great pleasure from exploding the “scoreboard journalism” that has dominated soccer writing for so long. But I don’t know of any who would claim that knowledge of analytics is a precursor to enjoyment of football (as daft a claim as anyone could make). Analytics writers are just as harsh on each other or themselves as they are on the self-proclaimed experts. They just don’t think that accepting lazy-half truths about soccer just because it’s a game and all in good fun is an adequate reason not to peel back its layers, to learn what makes it tick, to find new ways to enjoy the beautiful simplicity of the simplest game.

Newcastle United v Arsenal - Premier League

The Lead

Newcastle United earned £93 million in revenue the 2011/12 Premier League season, the 7th highest in the league. The year before they’d spent a not inconsiderable £27 million on transfer fees, which, as you know, are amortized and so still on the books. Wages totalled £64 million as well. With the club posting a £1 million profit last season, the margins are quite tight. Mike Ashley has already loaned himself £129 million, and the club continues to seek ways to expand its commercial revenues under managing director Derek Llambas.

Once could easily see a need here for a director of football, but only if the person filling that role had a considerable track record of responsible spending, intelligent and cost-effective allocation of resources, and a good sense of areas of the player market that have yet to be fully explored as a source of Premier League-ready talent.

I don’t know for certain Joe Kinnear isn’t that man. But I’m pretty damn sure he’s not. In any case, his train wreck interview with talkSPORT yesterday revealed a man who may not have a grasp on things that actually happened in real life. From the Guardian:

On Monday evening Kinnear gave a shambolic interview to Talksport in which the former Wimbledon manager claimed responsibility for signing Tim Krul [a goalkeeper recruited by Graeme Souness] as well as James Perch [bought by Chris Hughton], said Derek Llambezee [Llambias] had resigned as director of football [a position he has never held] and talked about Shola Amenobee, Yohan Kebab and Hatem Ben Afre rather than Shola Ameobi, Yohan Cabaye and Hatem Ben Arfa.

It’s certainly possible that Joe Kinnear’s David Brent-like public deportment may not reflect on his abilities as a future director of football. But if a company were interviewing for a position that involved the oversight of spending tens of millions of pounds on acquisitions vital to the future well-being of the business, and that person claimed the accomplishments of other persons as their own in a public forum mere hours after hiring them, one would hope that company would see the error of their ways and restart the process, whilst at the same apologizing for failing to do due diligence on such a crucial hire.

But this is Newcastle. When I first read Louise Taylor’s thesis on how Kinnear got hired–Mike Ashley didn’t like how Alan Pardew ‘shared the blame’ for Newcastle’s struggles last season with the owner, and so hired a director of football as revenge–it struck me as journalistic speculomasturbation in the extreme. Now I’m not so sure. The Premier League, despite any claims that gobs of money somehow equal sophistication, slouches toward television to be born and reborn over and over again, in spite of itself.
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Sunderland v Newcastle United - Premier League

We were warned.

Simon Kuper and Stefan Szymanksi’s book Soccernomics gave us some candid insight into football’s quirks and idiosyncrasies (mostly) off the pitch, including its notorious conservatism. One of the more memorable passages noted how several elite clubs still didn’t pay attention to small but vital details, like helping overseas players settle in quickly in their new locations as a means to facilitate their transition to a new team.

Many of us believe that in sports as in business, money naturally seeks out efficiency. After all, despite the enormous influence in luck in determining the success of one company over another in a particular market, success is also driven in large part from smart planning, good product development, and an intense focus on cost control.

So when we hear that the Premier League is the wealthiest football league in the world, we assume this is in part because its member clubs have been adept at exploiting all avenues of commercial revenue, retail and gate sales, and acquiring low-cost, high impact players. Clearly to be so rich, they must have been doing something right.

Except that football is not a conventional business. For one, the clubs aren’t selling a product; they’re playing football in a league. To that end, the Barclays Premier League proper has done some incredible work in negotiating on behalf of its member clubs its astronomical rights deal. Whatever you think of Richard Scudamore, the league has arguably been very good at exploiting its international popularity to the fullest extent possible.

So good in fact that of the 18 Premier League clubs that posted a breakdown of revenue by category for the 2011/12 season, 14 earned the bulk of their revenue from TV and broadcasting rights. Of those clubs, 12 earned more money in TV rights fees than all other revenue sources combined. I hope they all give Scudamore a nice bottle of single malt at Christmas.

To reiterate, this is money the clubs received from an agreed upon base/merit pay breakdown for a broadcast deal they didn’t play much of an active role in negotiating. The clubs did not market anything, employ any talent, develop any innovative business strategies to earn this revenue. It was simply handed to them by virtue of being in the top flight.

If you believe (as I do) that football is not a business in the conventional sense, there’s nothing really wrong with this. Clubs, after all, have historically existed to win football matches, not negotiate lucrative overseas commercial partnerships to maximize alternative revenue streams. Once upon a time, it was the job of the chairman who oversaw the club to ensure that it spend money wisely on good players and find a good manager who didn’t expect the boss to sign blank cheques on players. That most clubs “earned” the TV rights deal by staying in the PL should be good enough.

The problem is today the cost of maintaining a competitive Premier League first team skyrocketing. In fact, it’s nearing or has reached a competitive ceiling. Spending-to-win isn’t good enough for the vast majority of teams who aren’t bankrolled by infinitely deep-pocketed investors; in fact, it’s barely good enough for the tiny collection of teams “lucky” enough to be in that category.

Despite this, how these enormous TV rights revenues are spent is still in large part overseen by football coaches or football directors who know little more than how to get a player, an agent and a club representative in a room together at the same time. Newcastle’s bizarre decision to appoint Joe Kinnear as “director of football” is evidence that English football clubs may not be getting much smarter in how they address the crucial question of how to build a winning football club.

This is Kinnear’s role, in his own words (from the Guardian):

Asked who would have the final say on transfers, Kinnear said: “It’ll be me. What I’m saying is, between me, Alan [Pardew] and Graham [Carr, the chief scout], we’ll sit down and iron it out. If those two decide a player we’re looking at is not good enough, my ears will be wide open. It’s not a case of ‘like it or lump it’. If a close decision is to be made, though, and we’re running out of time and it’s something we have to do, whether that’s adding meat or beef to the team, or pace in wide areas, or someone who can guarantee us 20 goals a season, I will buy those players. I will take that chance once I’ve clarified that with Alan, that this is for the good of Newcastle.

“I’ll assess the transfer kitty with Mike next week once I’ve sat down with Alan first, find out what is wanted, who can be shifted out of the club – maybe we can get money back if we shift four or five of them – and then look at the targets.”

“…adding meat or beef to the team, or pace in wide areas, or someone who can guarantee us 20 goals a season.” No doubt the person to decide which players fit these depressing cliches will be Kinnear in consultation with Graham Carr (no word if Newcastle’s performance analyst Ben Stevens will play a role). This is an enormous amount of trust in one person for such a crucial undertaking. And Kinnear didn’t say anything about reevaluating the team’s overall approach to player development and recruitment, or first-to-market buying strategies that marked the club’s “French revolution” under Pardew.

None of this will come as a surprise to seasoned football supporters. But it does challenge the implied assumption made by opponents of UEFA’s Financial Fair Play’s break-even requirements for example that clubs have already explored all avenues in building a winning side beyond simply dumping more money than god into the transfer market.

It’s true that clubs like West Brom and Swansea will likely never be able to come close to securing the enormous commercial revenues of teams like Manchester United and Chelsea (although it’s not at all clear some of these clubs are doing enough to grow revenue in these areas). But I’m yet to be convinced that English or continental clubs have fully explored all options in ways to build a winning side beyond breaking the bank in costly transfers for so-called “proven” talent that proves to be anything but.

Spain v Uruguay: Group B - FIFA Confederations Cup Brazil 2013

The Lead

The Confederations Cup was once a bona fide friendly tournament. How do I know this? Because, as with all the world’s leading friendly tournaments, it was first organized by a Middle East nation to provide entertainment in the off-season. Called the King Fahd Cup, it was first played in October 1992, with four representative FIFA confederation tournament winners travelling to Saudi Arabia to participate (Argentina beat Saudi Arabia in the final 3-1 with Caniggia bagging the winner).

FIFA, perhaps sensing another sure fire way of cramming the football calendar with more footballing goodness, took over the tournament in 1997. It was played every two years until 2005 when FIFA smartly decided to use it as a World Cup tune-up tourney to take place in the host nation, a lucrative way to keep everyone on schedule in their prep for the Big Show while at the same time providing the world with yet another international tournament.

Still, for a short time nobody was fooled. It was a dress rehearsal. Not one without its moments, mind you. But only the most overworked commentators would have scrutinized every kick of the ball, drawing tortured causal latices to the next year’s World Cup.

No longer. Whether because of doubts over Brazil’s readiness on and off the pitch, or the North American-friendly kick off times, or because of the insatiable 24/7 football media machine which needs more and more football fuel to keep chugging along, the Confed Cup is now a thing. It has its own stub at whoscored.com. It is the subject of a host of analyses on ESPNFC. And most telling of all, it has its own Guardian Football Weekly dedicated podcast.

It seems the public shares this interest. As Roger Pielke Jr. notes:

While I’m partial to the idea that there are several distinguishing factors that make this instance special (including the fact Brazil are the hosts), I generally think this is also a case of television’s insatiable desire for more product. Conventional TV is bleeding profit as many viewers are dispersed in a cable universe that is itself under increasing threat of “cord cutting”–dropping cable altogether in favour of live-streaming services like Netflix.

Sports however, which are played live in real time and look gorgeous in high definition of the kind only TV can provide (for now), are still TV’s safest bet. But in order to capture and keep as many viewers as possible, TV needs a lot of sports to justify the increasing cost of event rights. Hence the incredible interest in the UEFA U21 tournament this time around, and now the Confed Cup. No doubt football fans are delighted with all this intense coverage, but the reality is now there is no off-season in soccer. Football is a year-round sport, and all of it is important with a capital ‘I.’

The problem is however is that sooner or later, if all televised football is must-see, essential viewing, then none of it is. Will all this exposure dilute the product? Maybe not. The Champions League has long been accused of being bloated beyond recognition, but it’s still among the most entertaining sports events in the world. Still, one yearns for the time when the Confed Cup was a silly lark in which we could watch the USA beat Spain in a semifinal in South Africa, all the while knowing it was ultimately meaningless.

Spain v Italy - UEFA EURO 2012 Final

As you may have read, I’m a supporter of Financial Fair Play. One of the reasons I don’t think that FFP will kill off any remaining competition in the top flight is because I’m not convinced that clubs currently operate at peak market efficiency, either in revenue or expenses.

I’ve already spoken a bit to the revenue side—in a nutshell, it’s not clear that English clubs for example have explored all commercial opportunities beyond the vast sums they receive in TV rights money (ironically, Man United’s leveraged buy out forced them to be very proactive in securing new revenue, including the NYSE).

But I’ve also argued that clubs have only just begun to fully exploring more efficient ways to allocate financial resources. One of the things I’ve harped on for a while is how FFP might encourage clubs to invest not only in improving academies, but in analytics research as well.

After meeting some of the leading lights in soccer analytics a few months ago at the Sloan MIT Sports Analytics conference in Boston, I got the distinct impression there was a lot of work to be done to improve individual player metrics in comparison with other sports. I don’t want to get into the specifics here, but it should be obvious why this is an incredibly difficult task. Football is a complex sport in which each player is mutually interdependent. We’re possibly a long way out from collecting meaningful data and analysing it to evaluate player performance.

Yet individual performance analysis is only one tool at clubs’ disposal in spending money on players more intelligently than in the past. Here’s Ian Lynam’s excellent article for the Guardian published earlier this week:

The amount of wages paid and to whom is clearly hugely important. What doesn’t receive as much attention is how that money is paid. It’s here that progressive clubs can gain an advantage. Remuneration strategy has become a discipline of its own in the corporate world and it has an obvious application in sport. Without necessarily paying more, clubs can increase player motivation, better align interests between club and player, and improve player satisfaction and the team dynamic.

Lynam is speaking here of performance-based pay. It’s not a theoretical concept, either; Manchester City chief executive Ferran Soriano used it at Barcelona and now at City. In practice, it involves paying player wages that are 2/3rds fixed, and 1/3rd variable, with the latter determined by team performance for those players who played in 60% of the team matches.

Lynam points out that football clubs are miles off from being able to provide a “winning probability added” bonus. Yet even if soccer performance analysts had the means to do so, it’s hard to see how it could improve much on Soriano’s model. First, we may discover that player performance metrics are “in-born” and difficult for player’s to consciously improve. If that’s the case, these metrics should form a part of contract negotiations for base pay, but not performance incentives. Second, team performance incentives prevent players from trying to figure out ways to “enhance” their numbers and throw-off the team dynamic. In the end the onus should be on the club to build a winning side with the right players, individual player metrics would likely be best applied before clubs add someone to the squad.

There is another approach that I hope to learn more about next week and which I wrote about yesterday, one proposed by the International Centre for Sports Studies. It uses a number of means to determine “true transfer value.”

Increasing the efficiency of transfer fee payments based on performance metrics and other economic factors would carry a lot of obvious financial benefits. Most importantly, it could help ensure teams are properly compensated for their best players should they decided to sell on, whilst at the same time preventing interested clubs from overspending on talent. It’s not certain whether the CIES report includes predictive metrics in their analysis, in order to prevent another Fernando-Torres-to-Chelsea-type sale. But the better the data and information, the more efficient the price, both for buyer and seller.

I hope to write a little more on the latter study next week. The summer transfer window is as good at time to do so as any!

An Indian sadhu (Hindu holy man) poses w

It reads as follows:

FIFA Statement: FIFA letter to Canadian Soccer Association (CSA)

Following communication between the CSA and FIFA, the matter related to Law 4 – The Player’s Equipment, the use of head covers and the situation arisen within the CSA has been presented to the members of the International Football Association Board (IFAB) for discussion.

The IFAB has exceptionally agreed to extend the conditions of the current experiment previously approved by IFAB in October 2012 (as per FIFA circular no. 1322), and to allow male players in Canada to wear head covers as well, as long as the following conditions are respected:

The head cover must:

· be of the same colour as the jersey
· be in keeping with the professional appearance of the player’s equipment
· not be attached to the jersey
· not pose any danger to the player wearing it or any other player (e.g. opening/closing mechanism around neck)

The letter sent by FIFA to the CSA on 13 June 2013 authorises the CSA to permit all players to wear head covers as described above, in all areas and on all levels of the Canadian football community.

This matter will once again be discussed by the IFAB in October 2013, before a final decision is reached at the next Annual General Meeting of the IFAB, taking place in March 2014.

This presumably means FIFA will take action on the matter beginning this October. The pressure is now on the QSF to issue a response.

Team GB v Brazil - International Friendly

The Lead

Hey guys. It’s the middle of June. We’ve got a Confederations Cup bearing down on us. It’s two months until the gears of the domestic season begins to grind. Why are you still reading about football? Do you have a problem? Do you need help?

The absence of football is clearly getting to some heads early this off-season. Like Jeff Powell.

Now this is pretty goddamn low-hanging fruit, I know, particularly after Powell’s somewhat embarrassing Thatcher apologia from last April. And I’m trying not to do this kind of thing any more, I’m honestly really trying.

But how any one could accept the empirical premise of this op-ed which currently sits atop the Daily Mail football section is beyond me:

Hands up all those who have heard of Razvan Rat, Ricky van Wolfswinkel, Jesus Navas, Modibo Diakite, Guillermo Varela, Aleksandar Tonev, Jose Canas and Fernandinho.

Hands on hearts, even if you have an inkling of those names now then how many of you knew who on earth they were as
recently as last month?

Thought not.

You can sort of see where he’s going with this. The Premier League isn’t attracting the stars like Neymar and Robert Lewandowski (maybe). It prefers spending on the cheap rather than break the bank on pricier English players. From here, Powell morphs this whole thing into an argument against the current loan system. It all means England won’t win the World Cup, which is what the Premier League is for, apparently.

Before we get into that, some very basic points need to be made here. As I mentioned above, it’s June 14th. That means there remains two-and-a-half months left of the transfer window in which these so-called superstars can be bought up as apparent proof that the Premier League is the best league in the world. To make this argument today completely undermines everything that follows. I could stop typing right now! And you may as well stop reading!

But a second point anyway: how many players have arrived in England as relative unknowns (and I mean relative: who in the hell doesn’t know who Jesus Navas is?) only to become major international commodities? Last season alone saw Michu and Benteke shine for mid-tablers like Swansea and Aston Villa. They would almost certainly have made Powell’s list had they arrived this season. Is the ability to spot and develop talent not a mark of an elite league?

And a third point: while major 80 million pound signings sell a ton of papers, they make for terrible business. We can have a conversation about the pros and cons of the loan system in place in Europe (it does permit for anti-competitive hoarding), but allocating enormous resources to secure the services of a single player, particularly with what we know about performance regression, and now with the introduction of Financial Fair Play, is just plain dumb. Much better to hedge bets over less expensive, and in some cases undervalued, foreign prospects.

Not once does Powell speak to the reforms being implemented by the Elite Player Performance Plan, which could help make the transition of young prospects into the Premier League easier and more affordable.

Best for now that Powell sticks to the keyboard and stay very far away from holding a position of actual power in the sport.
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