Archive for the ‘Football Finance’ Category

131054081

I’ve noticed that the release of the Major League Soccer salary information was met with much fanfare from our friends in the United Kingdom this time around. It was Tweeted out by several major journalists and is currently featured #1 on the Guardian list of favourite things, despite it being a biannual thing.

It must seem strange to see a team in which one player will be paid $50,000-a-year and another over $1 million. That’s because MLS does things a little differently. The single entity format can be a little tough to understand for those used to the European system, so I thought I would offer a quick and easy explanation for how it all works.

Single Entity Ownership Class A shares

In Major League Soccer, all teams are owned by a series of investors. Class A shares are owned by the league and its subsidiaries, and are split into three sub-categories: Class A1, Class A1b, and Class A2b. Class A1 shares are owned by state governments and the local muncipality in which the stadium is located, unless the state congress votes on a 2/3rds majority to allow the municipality to own the shares outright.

Class A1b shares are collateralized shares owned by all major US investment banks pari passu, although there are several exceptions based on geographical location (we don’t need to get into that here).

Class A2b shares are preferred stock divided among all the owner-investors who co-invest (but do not own) the respective teams in MLS. However, there are some individual exceptions—the New York Red Bulls are exempt from Class A1b, and instead held in perpetuity by the government of Austria.

I drew this diagram to help illustrate how Class A shares work and their permutations within MLS. It’s a little complex but should help:

finnegans wake

Single Entity Ownership Class B shares

This gets just a little more tricky, so bear with me. Class B MLS clubs shares are owned by investors who partner with MLS and its subsidiaries to own 2/3rds of each specific club. In fact, each class of share is divided according to specific clubs assets in a series of tranches, with dividends based on apportioned team profits, which are divided into transfer holdings, gate sales, television rights, commercial deals (although specific sets of merchandise are excluded as per the last collective bargaining agreement) and 32% of total revenues going back to MLS as part of a league-wide revenue sharing.

These tranches (not traunches, very common mistake) will be divided differently based on asset class performance, and some will be reinvested basked on marketability. There are roughly 140 sub-class divisions on these shares, as illustrated in the diagram below (sorry, I don’t know how to do the click-to-enlarge thing):

network-diagram-1

Salary Cap and Designated Players

The salary cap is determined in three part voting stage that involves the MLS board, club executives, and the player union. Voting is done on a quarterly basis, in accordance with provisions in the CBA that will award greater weight to each vote roughly depending on the league average club-to-revenue turnover. Clubs will lose voting rights once allocation money reaches a 25% of wages for the preceding three seasons. I know, that was the simple part!

The Designated Player is determined as percentage of the total value of Class A1b shares and a portion of the Class B shares. There can be three, and sometimes there are four, depending on the total club salary as a percentage of the league total. There was an exception to the share division, which later came to be known as the Tim Cahill Rule. Rather than pay the fourth DP through league revenue, the player would be determined by the club’s success in a Bond Swap Strategy in which Bond Yield exceeded the median club salary in the previous calendar year.

And I mean, that’s basically it. I don’t know how to make this any simpler. Ask any questions below and I’d be glad to try and answer them for you.

137473845

Stefan Szymanksi, the noted co-author along with Simon Kuper of Soccernomics, wrote a Tweet this morning in response to an op-ed in support of the Bundesliga in the Independent today:

Szymanksi for his part wrote a small critique of the Bundesliga, particularly addressing the notion that the league’s ticket prices are substantially more affordable (I’d show it to you but Szymanksi’s site looks a bit borked at the moment; here’s the cached version). Kieron O’Connor, author of the incredible Swiss Ramble blog which has recently rumbled back to life, added this important correction to the Indy piece as well, which cited a wage to turnover rate in the Bundesliga as 37.5%:

This kind of skepticism is very important, particularly with the rash of pro-German model op-eds that will inevitably precede the likely all-German final at Wembley Stadium. The venue will also provoke comparisons to the laissex-faire Premier League, and it would be easy (and I’ve done it too in the past) to attempt to use the one to bash the other.

Even so, it would be overly stubborn not to point out the benefits of the Bundesliga model, in which all but two teams have a 50+1 fan shareholder rule and all clubs are under a break-even licensing agreement. The Bundesliga model shouldn’t be grafted on other domestic league wholesale, but there is evidence that it provides club stability, reasonable profitability for private, minority investors, and competitive relevance in Europe.

The problem is football is a really bad marriage between sport and business. What works in the free market doesn’t usually graft on well to clubs locked in a promotion/relegation league system over a century old now. There is confusion over the purpose of a club-slash-business—is it to turn a profit for owners and investors, or to win trophies for fans? These two goals aren’t always mutually exclusive, but often the one comes at the expense of the other.

The Bundesliga model seems to have carefully addressed this precarious balancing act by letting private capital in the door to enjoy the rewards but not to steer the ship. It’s not perfect. I don’t know for certain but I suspect that Szymanksi would point out that the break-even requirement is one of the main reasons why Bayern Munich’s continued domestic dominance is assured for years to come (it’s not particularly good that the club bailed out Dortmund a mere decade ago when it faced bankruptcy). Bayern’s national popularity and rich history give it a built in advantage in revenues, an advantage nearly impossible for other Bundesliga clubs—who cannot spend wildly in excess of turnover on players—to circumvent.

Except this financial disadvantage is to some degree mitigated by an excellent academy system revamped following the disastrous 2000 Euros that in part built the Dortmund side that is in the Champions League final and which beat Bayern in the league last year. Yes, the club is set to lose one its premiere players in Mario Goetze to the league champions, but the mere fact that Stuttgart, Dortmund and Wolfsburg have all finished first in recent years indicates that money, whilst vital, is not an absolute guarantee of permanent success.

So beware the lure of the “England should adopt the German approach wholesale” argument. But don’t let your inner skeptic dismiss it out of hand, either.

104717754

The Guardian has released detailed financial figures on Premier League clubs available here, with a club-by-club summary here. I suspect this will be more a “come back to” resource for a while, rather than a revelatory data dump. Particularly as I think the Guardian has done this in previous years.

Still, David Conn’s observations are worth the price of admission. The raw fact is that despite hemming and hawing over Financial Fair Play, clubs still spend on player wages in the late 60s as a percentage of turnover. Total spend on agents? £77 million! Conn continues with some Grauniadista boilerplate:

Of other Premier League club employees, chief executives are now extremely well paid compared with companies with a similar turnover. The £2.6m earned by Manchester United’s best-paid director, believed to be David Gill, was the league’s highest.

Other employees, in catering, shop work and other contracted-out jobs, can still be paid the minimum wage. In 2008 a survey by the Fair Pay Network found Premier League clubs were paying cleaners, programme sellers and warehouse staff £5.52 per hour, and the mayor of London, Boris Johnson, urged London clubs to increase that to a “living wage”.

This is definitely a good point, but the fact is when clubs hoist nearly 70% of turnover on wages, they’re going to put the squeeze on other staff, as we saw the other day with unpaid analysts. But Conn’s conclusion speaks to one of the primary concerns over FFP raised by Stefan Szymanksi in a paper earlier this year, which predicted clubs would simply pocket money saved on player wages rather than invest to compete:

It remains to be seen what clubs will do with the money they save from players’ wages. The Premier League distributed just £12m to the Football Foundation last year. That was 0.5% of clubs’ income, despite the Premier League having pledged to distribute 5% of its total revenue to grassroots football.

Grassroots football is good, but why not invest in research and development, too? Shouldn’t England be the leader in club-led analytics research?

A new column dedicated to the money side of the game, Football Finance will appear every Wednesday.

Ian King over at 200% has written a must-read column on the FA’s decision to host the FA Cup final at 5:15 PM GMT. That may not seem like a particularly big deal, but King expertly reveals how the kick-off time affects fans of both sides:

All of this, however, reckons without the awesome powers of the Football Association to do their best to debase the very competition that bears their name. Their decision to play this season’s final at 5.15 in the afternoon would be funny, if it weren’t for the obvious ramifications of such a decision. Supporters from both Wigan and Manchester will have to make a round journey of around four hundred miles to get to this match, and the later the kick-off time is, the more difficult it will obviously be for supporters looking to get home on the evening of the match by train on a weekend that we already know will be disrupted by engineering work. A match kicking off at the time scheduled by the Football Association will finish at around 7.10 in the evening if there is no extra-time, giving Wigan Athletic supporters an hour and twenty minutes to get to London Euston railway station.

This, as King points out, will also prevent fans from enjoying the trophy presentation as they rush to catch the remaining trains home. It also tacitly encourages fans to spend the day drinking in London, a logistical failure in light of the recent violence in the stands during the Wigan/Millwall semifinal.

Most odious of all however are comments from FA General Secretary Alex Horne, quoted in their entirety by King:

We’re now used to consuming our football in those time slots. It really works. Lunchtime kick-offs just haven’t got the same appeal. The 5.15pm kick-off for the final was really successful. We added a couple of million viewers. It’s a sensible compromise. When we designed the new national stadium, we knew we needed to put content in it. That’s what is paying for the stadium. Over time we are paying off the debt we had to incur to build the stadium. Investing in Wembley is investing in football. It’s a positive for all of football.

This is the triumph of private sector influence over community entities in the last three decades—those in governance now rightly or wrongly follow the money wherever it may go. Therefore, the needs of the many (more paying customers, rights holders, TV advertisers) outweigh the needs of the few, or the one. Which means local fans consumers basically exist to provide gate receipts and stadium atmosphere for audiences watching on television.

The idea of football as ‘content’ to be ‘consumed’ was repeated by Premier League chief executive Richard Scudamore in his happy assessment of NBC’s considerable efforts to splash as much Bee Pee El action all over US screens next season. Scudamore told reporters, “Nowhere do they consume sports like they do here. We are not unhappy with our current broadcast partners (in the United States), but I can see we are on the threshold of taking it to a new level.”

Both Horne and Scudamore have sat through the same powerpoint presentations in which sport is simply an empty cipher (content) to be ingested and defecated by a willing audience (consumption).

Swiss Ramble meanwhile, whose blog has gone silent but who is still a vital presence on Twitter, gave some context to the FA’s desire to ensure its 150 year-old content sponsored by American beer Budweiser is consumed for the highest return possible:

Private loans led by official banking partners, secured on the promise of content to be consumed. This is the trend in football—the fan watching on television is now of paramount importance. Gate sales are a pleasant bauble, merchandise sales an integral component of revenue. But what matters now is television rights. And they dictate a 5:15 PM kick off is better for ratings, better for advertisers, better for future negotiated rights deals. A final that was once symbolized by hundreds of thousands of working class supporters singing Abide With Me in unison is now content ready for consumption.

Yum!

157951730

The Guardian reports:

The first day of the 2013-14 Premier League season will usher in a new era, after clubs voted to use Hawk-Eye’s goalline technology system and ratified new financial control measures designed to curb wage inflation.

The British-based firm Hawk-Eye, which rose to prominence with its involvement in tennis and cricket before being acquired by Sony, is understood to have been chosen over the German firm GoalControl to provide goalline technology from the start of next season.

The camera-based technology, which instantly relays to the referee whether a goal has been scored via an ear piece, will be installed in all 20 Premier League grounds during the close season. The equipment will be paid for out of central Premier League funds.

No word on the per-game cost and stadium installation fee, but if it’s in the ballpark of GoalControl’s per game fee, it’s pretty much chump change. Fears of fans paying out of pocket to cover it in ever higher ticket prices seem to be a little extreme.

Perhaps more importantly, the Premier League also ratified their new financial regulations, which include Financial Fair Play-like player spending limits, which prevent clubs spending in excess of £52 million from using more than £4 million from TV rights fees, and prevents clubs from posting a loss more than £105 million over three years (which is pretty goddamn generous).

Brave new world, eh? Justice for goals, and socialist, centralized re-distributive welfare statism. Thatcher would be proud.

> on October 4, 2011 in Portsmouth, England.

The Lead

The Premier League is rich, but they don’t want to spread the love. That’s the story the Guardian ran with this morning in light of record earnings from TV rights deals:

With the Premier League close to finalising a record £5.5bn windfall in broadcasting income, MPs have also warned of this being soaked up by a “culture of greed” at the top of the game and called for the money to be shared more widely to benefit the grassroots and fans’ organisations.

The blockbuster TV deal, fuelled by the emergence of BT as a rival to BSkyB for domestic live rights and the continued growth of overseas income, has reignited a fierce debate across football and Westminster about how the cash should be shared and how far the Premier League’s responsibilities to the wider game should go. Some MPs have called for a minimum of 7.5% of the total income to be distributed to the grassroots, while others have called for a new funding formula that disaggregates the distribution of cash from the three-year cycle of TV deals to provide greater certainty.

There is another discussion to be had out of all this, and that’s the prospect that the TV rights juggernaut may not simply continue on as is forever. When that drop occurs, those smaller groups that rely on the good graces of the top flight are almost certain to take the most damage first.

Sports on TV is more coveted than ever with instant streaming TV and PVRs and downloadable episodes on iTunes etc., football matches happen at an appointed time and place. You have to watch them live by their very nature. This makes them very attractive to TV networks in search of a dwindling younger audience desired by traditional advertisers.

However this does not make TV immune to the growth and improvement of high speed internet cables, which continue to make the prospect of watching games via the Internet more and more palatable. And as the price of TV sports packages increases, more people will turn to alternate sources—including more affordable online subscriptions—to consume football.

Those margins are smaller than those offered by TV, but that TV audience is certain to shrink over time. Moreover, the growth of Instant TV will cause overall TV audiences to drop in the next several decades. That includes those who might have purchased a PL TV rights package had they kept their cable subscription.

I’m just saying, if I’m an investor playing the long game, football on TV seems like a great short term buy. But those hoping to reap the rewards for years to come should take pause.
Read the rest of this entry »

154871515

The Lead

I arrived home late Saturday night from the Sloan MIT Sports Analytics Conference in Boston (which you’ll be hearing about later on this blog), and on Sunday I thought it would be helpful to give my significant other a window in the basic idea of sports analytics by watching the kind-of-inaccurate-though-illustrative film Moneyball.

There’s a scene toward the end of the movie where Brad Pitt is approached by Fenway Sports Group principle owner John Henry about becoming the GM for the Red Sox. Henry is a sabermetrics true believer, and wants Beane to mirror his relative success with the A’s in Boston. This moment hints at the future wide adaptation of sports analytics in baseball, which has since erased much of the first mover ‘Moneyball’ effect. The final frames of the film remind the audience the Red Sox would go on to win their first World Series since 1918 two years later. You see? It worked.

And so to demonstrate the relative state of analytics in the football world, since FSG’s purchase of Liverpool FC in 2010, the team has finished 6th and 8th in the following two seasons. Today, the club is in 7th place, 10 points out from the final Champions League qualification spot.

There are some encouraging signs the club’s fortunes may be on the mend—the club was hurt by an unluckily low shot and save percentages in the last two seasons yet now seems to be on a relative uptick—but the bill in getting the club to its present position has come in and it doesn’t look good. From the Guardian:

Liverpool have reported a £21.8m increase in their debt – now £87.2m overall – and a loss of £40.5m in their annual accounts. A restructuring of their accounting period to align it with the football season means that the figures apply to the 10 months between 1 August 2011 to 31 May 2012.

They show that although commercial revenue increased, so did the club’s overall liabilities. However, the club’s managing director, Ian Ayre, played down the significance of a rise in debt levels. “It’s definitely not something I believe anyone should be worried or concerned about. It is seasonal – our debt goes up and down,” he told the Liverpool Echo. “We have money to pay out and money coming in, just like any business.

Ayre of course is correct, but sustained competitive and commercial revenues will only grow with solid success. A speeding up of the continued slow progress of football analytics may continue to help Liverpool overcome the disastrous Comolli era, and it can’t come soon enough…
Read the rest of this entry »