Archive for the ‘MLS’ Category

FC Barcelona v New York Red Bulls

So the new director of football operations at New York City FC is American playing legend Claudio Reyna:

Reyna, 39, has strong ties to both MLS and Manchester City, and is one of the most decorated figures in American soccer history. He spent four seasons playing for Manchester City from 2003-07 before returning to MLS, where he joined the New York Red Bulls as the franchise’s first Designated Player. He appeared in 29 matches for the club before injuries forced him to retire midway through the 2008 season.

Reyna is leaving his position with the US Soccer Federation as Youth Technical director. This is as pitch-perfect appointment as Man City and MLS could envision. An former American international who featured in four World Cups, an ex-City midfielder, and a person with experience in youth development. That’s the appearance of course, and MLS has staged managed this with consummate professionalism.

Politically though, it was also an intelligent way to ingratiate City with the local football scene. I’m still waiting to see the chips starting to fall with regard to City’s owners, once the cable news cabal gets wind of it. But until then, smiles all around!

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This is of interest to Counter Attack as we’ve been tracking Don Garber and Dan Courtemanche’s movements in choreographing a stadium deal in Queens for a while now. There is staunch community opposition there to developing the park in Flushing, and the group in question–the Fairness Coalition of Queens–put out a statement today on the development:

“We welcome Major League Soccer to New York City. We are pleased with their new willingness to consider other sites in New York. The proposal for a stadium inside the heart of Flushing Meadows-Corona Park is deeply flawed and would irrevocably damage a vital community resource.

We look forward to finding a more appropriate home for the team that does not sacrifice public parkland and that does not giveaway parkland to a documented human rights abuser. Lets make this a development that all New Yorkers can be excited about.”

As you can see, the group isn’t hesitant to draw attention to Manchester City’s owners and the human rights record of the United Arab Emirates, which is not a battle MLS, City and the Yankees will want to countenance. Despite the work of MLS in lobbying to develop the area, New York Yankees president Randy Levine said the team could start playing in Yankee Stadium:

Guardian US writer Graham Parker has a great summary of the timeline here.

From mlssoccer.com:

After three years of discussions and negotiations, Major League Soccer Commissioner Don Garber announced on Tuesday that English Premier League powerhouse Manchester City FC and Major League Baseball’s legendary New York Yankees have teamed up to acquire MLS’s 20th expansion club.

The new team will be named New York City Football Club (NYCFC) and is expected to begin play in 2015.

The Yankees, according to the New York Times, will own about a quarter of the team. This is very much being painted as a Manchester City project, rather than a separate investor by the UAE ownership group that owns City.

The team already have a Twitter account up and running. So some questions immediately jump to mind:

What does this mean for the New York Red Bulls? Do they view this as an infringement on their NY market share, something they’ve been struggling with located as they are in New Jersey? Will they consider rebranding?

What does this mean for NASL’s NY Cosmos? Are they still holding out for a move to the big leagues? Can New York sustain three MLS teams? If not, what is the fate of Cosmos redux?

What will Man City’s strategy be in running the club? If it’s to be a mere farm team for the Premier League side, is this really the coup that Don Garber thinks it is? And how will a club with such limitless financial resources reconcile themselves with MLS’ designated player system?

Is this a good thing or bad thing for the future aspirations of Major League Soccer to be the best league in the world by 2022?

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Lookie here! Some rando on Twitter says so! Well, a Reuters Miami correspondent:

Perhaps not the most closely guarded secret in Major League Soccer at the moment. I emailed MLS’s vice president of communications Dan Courtemanche for comment on how far this thing has progressed and will get back to you if I hear anything that is remotely interesting.

But from a fantasists perspective, you know a league has arrived when the foreign owners start showing up trying to run the place.

Independiente Argentina v Toronto FC

It hasn’t been the best couple of weeks for Toronto FC (or months, or years). With a win-less streak now stretching to eight games, and with just one win in its last 24 MLS games, the Reds are in danger of slipping even further into irrelevancy in the Toronto sports market.

For those that were around in the early years, it’s staggering to see the fall from grace. This was a club that wasn’t just the darling of the Toronto sports scene but for much of MLS for a while at the end of last decade. There wasn’t an empty seat in the stadium for almost three straight years, despite struggles on the pitch.

In fact, what seemed like “struggles” then were only a taste of what was to come. Little did TFC fans realize that those first three years would represent a high water mark for the club. They improved each of the first three seasons, finishing 2009 just one point from a playoff spot.

On the morning of October 24, 2009 Toronto FC was a middling team that was one win away from making its first playoff appearance. Fans had reason to hope.

Then, in a driving rainstorm, Macoumba Kandji scored for the New York Red Bulls just three minutes into the Reds’ final game of the year. New York, a club that was 21 points behind Toronto at kick-off, would go on to score four more goals that night to deny TFC a spot in the playoffs.

The enduring image of the night was interim head coach Chris Cummins standing on the sideline, shoulders slumped with rain pouring off his black trench coats. He didn’t even have the energy to shout instructions to his players any longer; his mind may have been on catching the first flight back to Heathrow.

Cummins remains the most successful of Toronto’s eight managers. The club has lost 52 times since that night, with only 21 wins. Along the way they have been forced to cut season ticket prices to year one levels and watched as a once vibrant and sold-out stadium turn into a cynical, often half-empty shell. What was once fan passion is now mostly anger. That is if the club is lucky. At least if the fans are angry they still care. Increasingly there is less anger.

So, what happened? How did Toronto FC become so very bad? It’s indeed puzzling, as the Reds have the financial resources to compete and ownership has invested in both players and infrastructure. Yet, the team just seems to get worse and worse.

The simple answer – and the answer most want to point to – is that the investor/owners in Maple Leaf Sports & Entertainment don’t know what they’re doing. It’s increasingly difficult argument to challenge, even if it appears a tad simplistic. The truth is, there has been one consistent element to the club and that’s ownership.

What’s even more baffling about that is that, in isolation, most of the moves MLSE has made to support their franchise in that time made a lot of sense. In 2006, MLSE recognized that they didn’t know how to run a soccer team and so looked to hire a guy that had the experience they didn’t. In retrospect, hiring Mo Johnston as coach and eventually director of football was a terrible idea, but at the time it was pretty uncontroversial.

When it became clear that Johnston wasn’t the right guy for the job, MLSE reached out (and opened their pocket book) to one of the biggest names in the game in Jürgen Klinsmann to assist them in the search.

Few criticized MLSE’s hiring of Klinsmann. So, when he came back with the name of Aron Winter as the right man to bring TFC back from the dead, most fans were excited. After all, this was a guy that had played at the highest levels and was part of one of Europe’s most storied clubs.

Instead, things got worse. A lot worse. So MLSE listened to the prevailing advice of the day and sought out a “MLS guy” to run the show.

Enter Kevin Payne, an experienced manager from the club that was only associated with success in the league’s earliest days. Again, next to no one questioned the hire.

It’s too early to evaluate Payne, but not to point out his similarities with other MLSE hires. Payne was an attractive candidate; he combined brash talk with a long and impressive resume. When MLSE hires someone it almost always tends to be an industry name. You rarely see the company put its trust in an internal employee, or in allowing a young executive to grow in its role.

With MLSE style seems to matter more than substance. It plays better with fans and media, but, as history tells us, it rarely seems to work.

There is a certain arrogance in the philosophy. It suggests that Toronto is too big a market to be appropriate for an entry-level managerial candidate.

That might point to the biggest problem of all – arrogance. Despite two decades of losing, MLSE continues to believe that it is a major player in North American sports. It continues to make the same errors and it continues to get the same results.

And, all fans can do is hope against hope that they eventually will learn from their mistakes and bring the city a winner, and that hope is running thin. Worse, it’s turning into indifference.

You know what? I don’t give a good goddamn if you’ve seen this already. Watch it again, and be thankful you’re alive.

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I’ve noticed that the release of the Major League Soccer salary information was met with much fanfare from our friends in the United Kingdom this time around. It was Tweeted out by several major journalists and is currently featured #1 on the Guardian list of favourite things, despite it being a biannual thing.

It must seem strange to see a team in which one player will be paid $50,000-a-year and another over $1 million. That’s because MLS does things a little differently. The single entity format can be a little tough to understand for those used to the European system, so I thought I would offer a quick and easy explanation for how it all works.

Single Entity Ownership Class A shares

In Major League Soccer, all teams are owned by a series of investors. Class A shares are owned by the league and its subsidiaries, and are split into three sub-categories: Class A1, Class A1b, and Class A2b. Class A1 shares are owned by state governments and the local muncipality in which the stadium is located, unless the state congress votes on a 2/3rds majority to allow the municipality to own the shares outright.

Class A1b shares are collateralized shares owned by all major US investment banks pari passu, although there are several exceptions based on geographical location (we don’t need to get into that here).

Class A2b shares are preferred stock divided among all the owner-investors who co-invest (but do not own) the respective teams in MLS. However, there are some individual exceptions—the New York Red Bulls are exempt from Class A1b, and instead held in perpetuity by the government of Austria.

I drew this diagram to help illustrate how Class A shares work and their permutations within MLS. It’s a little complex but should help:

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Single Entity Ownership Class B shares

This gets just a little more tricky, so bear with me. Class B MLS clubs shares are owned by investors who partner with MLS and its subsidiaries to own 2/3rds of each specific club. In fact, each class of share is divided according to specific clubs assets in a series of tranches, with dividends based on apportioned team profits, which are divided into transfer holdings, gate sales, television rights, commercial deals (although specific sets of merchandise are excluded as per the last collective bargaining agreement) and 32% of total revenues going back to MLS as part of a league-wide revenue sharing.

These tranches (not traunches, very common mistake) will be divided differently based on asset class performance, and some will be reinvested basked on marketability. There are roughly 140 sub-class divisions on these shares, as illustrated in the diagram below (sorry, I don’t know how to do the click-to-enlarge thing):

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Salary Cap and Designated Players

The salary cap is determined in three part voting stage that involves the MLS board, club executives, and the player union. Voting is done on a quarterly basis, in accordance with provisions in the CBA that will award greater weight to each vote roughly depending on the league average club-to-revenue turnover. Clubs will lose voting rights once allocation money reaches a 25% of wages for the preceding three seasons. I know, that was the simple part!

The Designated Player is determined as percentage of the total value of Class A1b shares and a portion of the Class B shares. There can be three, and sometimes there are four, depending on the total club salary as a percentage of the league total. There was an exception to the share division, which later came to be known as the Tim Cahill Rule. Rather than pay the fourth DP through league revenue, the player would be determined by the club’s success in a Bond Swap Strategy in which Bond Yield exceeded the median club salary in the previous calendar year.

And I mean, that’s basically it. I don’t know how to make this any simpler. Ask any questions below and I’d be glad to try and answer them for you.