Archive for the ‘Guest Post’ Category


In this guest post from Kyle Matte, he looks at the value that Melky Cabrera has provided the Blue Jays this year, and whether it’s realistic, or reasonable, for the club to make him a Qualifying Offer after the season. Follow Kyle on Twitter at @KyleMatte.

Statistics as of the end of the day, July 28th.

Through four months, Melky Cabrera has been the rock in a Jays line-up packed with injury, inconsistency, and underwhelming performance. He’s appeared in 106 of 107 games for the second place Blue Jays, leading off for 16 while Jose Reyes missed the first half of April with a wonky hamstring, and hitting third for nine games with Edwin Encarnacion and Adam Lind on the disabled list with lower body injuries. Save for one late inning pinch-hit opportunity in the nine-hole, Melky has spent his remaining 80 games in the two-spot, providing a line drive pumping bridge between the speedy Reyes and the dynamic Dominican duo.

For fans who watched their fair share of the embarrassment that was the 2013 Toronto Blue Jays, this comes as a shock. Melky was a shell of his former self, at least in the 88 games he was able to get himself into, looking more like an old man nearing retirement – Raul Ibanez comes to mind – than a 28 year old coming off back-to-back outstanding seasons with the Royals and Giants. On August 2nd, he was placed on the disabled list with what the team called a left knee strain, and the left fielder wouldn’t play again that season. “Good riddance” was a sentiment shared by many, as Melky was looking like a total waste of the guaranteed 16 million dollars he’d received just nine months prior. A boisterous minority were happy to proclaim him nothing more than a product of performance enhancing drugs, and slammed the General Manager for giving a known cheat who in their view had become lazy and complacent so much money.

Words were swallowed and jaws hit the floor a month later when the team announced Cabrera had undergone surgery to have a benign tumor removed from his spinal cord. It was believed this tumor had been pressing against his nerves, causing pain and weakness in his lower half. To say Melky was a wild card entering the 2014 season would be a massive understatement – no one knew what to expect.

Through 474 plate appearances Melky has produced a .313/.362/.487 slash line, contributing to a .371 wOBA and 134 wRC+. Among qualified MLB left fielders, those figures rank 4th and 5th respectively; thoroughly impressive for a player who was well below average offensively last season. His strikeout rate (11.4%) is the lowest it’s been since 2009 despite an upward trend across baseball, while his walk rate (7.0%) is right about at his career mark of 7.2%. His overall approach has shown improvement, too. If maintained, Melky’s current 43.9% swing rate would be his lowest since 2009, and while fewer swings isn’t necessarily positive, the fact that the decline has come predominantly on pitches outside the zone, is. His current 28.6% O-swing rate would be his lowest since, again, 2009, and is between 4% and 8% lower than his rates over his previous three seasons. Melky has the ability to drive just about anything he can reach, but being more selective is always a good thing.

Melky’s 14 home runs in 2014 have averaged 103.9 miles per hour off the bat, with an average true distance of 393.6 feet (per ESPN). In 2012, his last healthy season, he averaged 104.4 miles per hour and 393.1 feet. In 2011, it was 105.0 mph and 406.9 feet. Furthermore, at 21.1%, his line drive rate has remained consistent with the marks he has established since his breakout 2011 season with the Royals.

In terms of bat speed, Cabrera’s still got it.

Things aren’t all chocolate and roses, however. Despite playing arguably the second easiest defensive position on the diamond, Melky remains a below average defender. His UZR/150 in 2014 currently sits at -10.1, and while that’s a significant improvement upon his dismal -14.8 last season, it’s still a far cry from his passable -2.3 UZR/150 in left field for the Giants in 2012 and his -9.8 UZR/150 in center field for the Royals in 2011. He’s passing the eye test a lot better – largely due to the fact, you know, that his legs actually work – but the numbers still don’t particularly like him out there. He ranks 17th in defensive figures among the 20 qualified left fielders, ahead of only Nelson Cruz, Shin-Soo Choo, and Matt Kemp.

With Cabrera’s contract set to expire after the World Series, it creates an interesting profile to project moving forward, both in terms of potential value on a Qualifying Offer and a long-term deal. The left fielder is currently on pace for 3.0 WAR by the ZIPS and Steamer projection systems, and given that both are forecasting a slight improvement in rest-of-season defense and a decline in rest-of-season offense, the figure seems fair.

Referring back to my pre-season article on Colby Rasmus and his impending Qualifying Offer (aside: boy, that “floor” of 2 WAR I assumed sure seems absurd now), we can gain a rough estimate for average annual salary based on cumulative three-year WAR. The total for Melky would be 4.5 (2012) – 0.9 (2013) + 3.0 (2014) = 6.6 WAR, which correlates to an annual salary of around 12.8 million. This equates to a 60% raise on Cabrera’s previous salary, and while some may ask whether the Blue Jays can afford it with their freshly tightened purse strings, the better question may be, can they afford not to?

I’ve been a strong supporter of Rasmus for years now, but with each passing game it’s looking more and more like his days in a Blue Jays uniform are numbered. His defense has been shaky – both visually and statistically – and outside of the occasional home run, his offensive contributions have been unacceptable. He’s proven to be more of a platoon bat that requires a shield from same-side pitching than a true full-time starter, and in a healthy lineup it would be hard to argue he deserves to be hitting any higher than seventh.

Rasmus is a nice piece possessing potential, but when that potential starts costing eight figures per year, it’s probably time to let someone else try to tap into it.

Rasmus’ likely departure makes retaining Melky Cabrera essential, as an outfield that has Kevin Pillar in left and Anthony Gose in center – both as regulars – is simply an impossible scenario to justify. Should Pillar manage to mend the bridges he appears to have burned within the organization’s hierarchy, he and Gose could prove to be a more than adequate platoon in centerfield in 2015. The pair would provide an excellent internal stop-gap, earning around a million dollars combined while keeping the seat warm for the rapidly ascending Dalton Pompey.

Returning to Cabrera; the first step in the process is the aforementioned Qualifying Offer. The value of the Offer is the average of the 125 highest salaries in baseball that year. In 2012 that was 13.3 million, and last winter, it was 14.1 million. If we assume a similar 6% increase, the figure is likely to fall around 14.9 million for free agents this offseason. Completely coincidentally, the combined 2014 salary of Cabrera and Rasmus totals 15 million. There have been some whispers that the Blue Jays would be unable to make a Qualifying Offer to any of their free agents in fear they might accept, but if you consider the salaries of the outfield in a vacuum, the organization could theoretically afford to make the Offer to one without seeing a net increase in payroll. Of course, this ignores the 6 million dollar raise awaiting Jose Reyes, but if Anthopoulos needs an angle with ownership, there’s a decent start here.

By making the Offer, Anthopoulos would lock the Blue Jays into one of three outcomes. The first: that Melky accepts. It would be an awfully large sum on paper, but the saying “There’s no such thing as a bad one year deal” exists for a reason. Last offseason, Dave Cameron of FanGraphs looked into the value of a win on the free agent market and came up with a rough estimate of 6.0 million per WAR, while also noting the 10% or so annual inflation across free agency over the past decade. That would place the going rate at 6.6 million per WAR this offseason. Should Melky sign the Qualifying Offer at 14.9 million, the outfielder would need to produce 2.3 WAR — a plateau he’s reached in 3 of the last 4 years — for the club to get “fair” market value.

Outcome number two would be that Melky declines the Qualifying Offer and signs elsewhere, guaranteeing the Blue Jays a compensatory draft pick at the end of the first round. This would allow the Blue Jays to sign a different free agent with attached compensation — like Nelson Cruz, James Shields, or even Jon Lester — without crippling their draft bonus pool, or, plug Cabrera’s void with a non-qualified free agent or trade acquisition and enter a second consecutive amateur draft with a pair of high picks.

The third possible outcome, and probably the most desirable for both Blue Jays fans and the organization, would be for Melky to decline the Qualifying Offer and find himself in a depressed market. Should Cabrera and his agent discover that the grass isn’t always greener — like so many Qualified free agents did nine months ago — Alex Anthopoulos and friends would find themselves in the highly enviable position of possessing a massive amount of leverage in the market. The Blue Jays would have the opportunity to float a multi-year deal to retain the services of Cabrera in his remaining prime years at a below market rate.

As an example, let’s envision a scenario in which after finding lukewarm interest in his services due to the draft pick noose, Melky Cabrera signs a 3 year deal worth a total of 38.4 million to return to Toronto — the 12.8 million dollar annual salary I had estimated. Taking the projected 6.6 million per win discussed earlier, Melky would only need to produce 5.8 WAR over the course of the deal for the club to get “fair” market value. There’s a very real possibility that he comes up short as his defense falters and his bat is unable to sustain the production; but alternatively, it’s not difficult to see Cabrera reaching and/or exceeding 5.8 WAR in three years with relative ease, and it’s increasingly rare for teams to find surplus value in free agency.

Regardless of which result comes to fruition, it’s increasingly clear that the Blue Jays need to make Melky Cabrera a Qualifying Offer if they can’t get him under contract even sooner. He’s proven invaluable to this organization during its somewhat surprising playoff push, and the front office is in a position to protect both the short and long term aspirations in one fell swoop. Don’t screw this one up, Jays.


In this guest post from Kyle Matte, he looks at how some of the peripherals suggest that the outstanding results the Jays have gotten from Dustin McGowan since he moved to the bullpen aren’t maybe as outstanding as they seem. Follow Kyle on Twitter at @KyleMatte.

Dustin McGowan has been a wildly enigmatic pitcher through the first three months of the 2014 season. He set the Grapefruit League ablaze en route to being named to a rotation that ranked 29th and 28th in ERA and FIP respectively last year, with the hope he could help steer it in a more positive direction. Despite his outstanding numbers in an admittedly small sample the decision wasn’t an easy one, and the organization publicly went back and forth regarding their plans for the right hander. McGowan was a stud out of the bullpen in 2013 and has a well-documented injury background, yet the alternatives proved so inept in March that there was no other reasonable choice for the club to make but to try him in the rotation.

He made his season debut against the New York Yankees on April 4th — his first in over thirty months — and it probably went as well as could be honestly imagined, given the rust; 4 runs allowed on 9 base runners while recording just 8 outs. The poor results were accepted by most, but what caused a stir amongst savvy fans were his swinging strikes – or the lack there of. Chops McGowan induced just three whiffs across his 72 pitches (4.2%), as the Yankees made contact with or fouled off pitch after pitch. It was suggested on the Twitter machine that Dustin may have been tipping his pitches, a rumor that was later substantiated by Pitching Coach Pete Walker.

The pitch-tipping story quickly became a thing of the past, but the elusive swinging strikes remained an ongoing battle for McGowan. Over the eight starts he would make through April and May, McGowan reached the 10% swinging strike rate plateau just three times, with his high water mark coming at 12.9% on April 23rd against the Baltimore Orioles. These struggles were a new thing for McGowan. While working as a reliever in 2013, he maintained an 11.5% swinging strike rate for the season. Among 273 relievers with at least 20 innings pitched (via Fangraphs)that rate ranked 76th – tied with Brett Cecil in the 72nd percentile; among very good company.

Manager John Gibbons seemed openly relieved when it was announced McGowan would be returning to the bullpen, where he had proven to be a valuable and reliable piece. High leverage relief pitchers enter games in the late innings, usually with a narrow lead, and often with runners on base. In terms of run expectancy, two of the best ways to get out of such scenarios with minimal damage is through strikeouts and groundballs, and Dustin had proved proficient at coaxing both. 22.8% of batters he faced walked back to the dugout with their head hung in shame, and 46.6% of balls put in play burned the hypothetical worms in the Rogers Centre turf. Those figures ranked 108th(60th percentile) and 102nd(63rd percentile) respectively among the 273 relievers with at least 20 innings pitched – neither elite, but both well above average.

Unfortunately, Dustin McGowan simply hasn’t been the same pitcher since his return to the pen. Sure, on the surface he’s been outstanding – just two earned runs allowed 16.2 innings pitched (1.08 ERA) through June 25th – but the underlying numbers suggest that unless he can rediscover his old self, a tidal wave of regression might be heading his way. His bullpen strikeout rate has sunk to just 18.6%, while his overall groundball rate is a Todd Redmond-esque 37.5%. McGowan’s success can almost entirely be tied to two completely unsustainable numbers; a .180 BABIP, and an 84.8% strand rate in his relief appearances. I know Toronto’s fielding is much improved, but there’s not a defense in existence that will turn 82.0% of balls in play into outs once the sample size starts to grow beyond a few handfuls of innings.

This leads to the obvious question: what happened? While we can further analyze particular aspects of the results – which I’ll do below – there’s a limitless deluge of possible reasons for the variance. It could be a change within McGowan, mentally or physically. Perhaps he’s still wearing his insulin pump on the mound which he didn’t last season, or maybe there’s been an immeasurable alteration in the kinetic motion of his delivery. There could be an adjustment on the side of the hitters, too. After years in baseball purgatory, McGowan has returned to a landscape where scouting reports are more advanced than ever before. It’s entirely possible teams have formulated a book on him, are significantly more aware of his tendencies, and are able to game plan to take away his strengths.

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In this guest post from Kyle Matte we look at which players the major mock drafts have linked the Jays to, how those players fit the patterns established by the drafts of the Anthopoulos era, and what to expect on Thursday night, as the Jays hold the ninth and eleventh picks in the MLB draft. Follow Kyle on Twitter at @KyleMatte, and stay tuned to DJF on Thursday night for our annual draft live blog!

In early May here at DJF, I looked back at the Toronto Blue Jays 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 drafts, attempting to identify a template or prototype for what this regime looks for in amateur pitchers and hitters. I won’t go into too much detail regarding the methodology (you can read all about it by checking out the article), but by combining scouting information and physical data from 80 notable prospects selected across the aforementioned drafts, a number of trends emerged for what Alex Anthopoulos and company covet most. By awarding points for meeting certain criteria, seven pitchers and five hitters widely considered to be in the top 60 overall emerged as the most suitable prospects – by my system, at least.

The regular seasons for both the high school and college ranks have reached their conclusions, though for many prospects, the baseball season carries on. College tournaments in the United States are well underway and will continue through June before culminating in the College World Series on June 25th, while high school prospects have been engaged in Showcase events that offer them one final opportunity to display their talent on a level playing field.

With that being said, barring serious injury, it’s unlikely that anything happening on the diamond over the last week or so has had a dramatic effect on any kind of ranking or perception by a front office. Teams have established their targets; most of what has been happening (and will continue to happen) leading up to Thursday night is extensive dialogue between organizations and player agents advisors. “We like your player. Slot for the ninth pick is 3 million. Will your client sign for 2.5?” The conversations are (likely) far more delicate and professional, but with the talent level established, signability becomes one of the biggest determining factors in the decision-making process. Unfortunately, outside of the occasional anonymous source, the general public is not privy to such exchanges, and furthermore, it’s probable that whatever number gets floated by advisors differs from team to team based upon client preference. The only way we might be able to gather the tone or flow of those conversations is through draft analysts and/or insiders who are presumably slotting players to teams in their mock drafts for a reason.

In this article, we’ll look at the most recent mock drafts published by Baseball America,, MLB Draft Insider, Perfect Game, ESPN, and to see who the experts are slotting to Toronto at 9 and 11. In most cases, these mocks will be their penultimate edition, as a final mock is usually released the morning or afternoon of the big day. We’ll conclude the article by looking at the twelve players I originally outlined to see where they presently stand in the eyes of the scouting community.

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In this guest post from Kyle Matte we get a look at what the future holds for Colby Rasmus, as he begins his final season before free agency, and whether the Jays can keep him. Follow Kyle on Twitter at @KyleMatte.

When Major League Baseball’s newest Collective Bargaining Agreement was under discussion, both sides acknowledged that the Type A/Type B free agent compensation system needed to be re-worked. It put numerous players in a position where their leverage was being artificially hauled down by a mechanism that offered them little to no benefit. The acceptance of arbitration would at best gain them a one-year deal, and because of the way salary escalation was handled, even the best players were looking at maybe a 20% raise on their previous year’s earnings. Always seeking the security of a long term deal, the offer was almost universally declined.

The two sides came up with the Qualifying Offer – a way to protect teams from losing elite free agents for nothing, while limiting the number of mid-tier free agents carrying draft pick compensation because of the hefty figure involved: a one year deal with a guaranteed salary equal to the average of the top 125 players in all of baseball. Part of that plan has certainly come to fruition. Heading into 2011, 83 free agents had draft pick compensation attached: 33 Type A, 50 Type B. In the two years since the Qualifying Offer was implemented, just 9 and 13 free agents have felt the draft pick noose hung around their neck. What likely wasn’t a part of the plan is that the non-elite free agents still being tagged are finding a market more unwelcoming than ever before, as front offices have proven increasingly protective of their draft picks and bonus money. Some fault must be placed on the agents for misreading the market their clients were jumping head-first into, but any system that prevents above average talent like Stephen Drew from finding legitimate, fair contracts is obviously flawed. Kendrys Morales: there are simply no words for your decision making process.

This system is relevant to Toronto, as come the end of the 2014 season, one of our own will be marching into free agency: Colby Rasmus. Mind you, we thought much the same last year, and we saw how that turned out with Josh Johnson. The situation with Rasmus is different, however, for two main reasons. The first is that he’s been healthy; his 458 plate appearances in 2013 were a career low, and he still had his most productive output. The second is that he’s a position player. Of the 22 players to receive qualifying offers, 16 have been of the non-pitcher persuasion. Teams have, perhaps wisely, been especially wary of spending big on free agent pitchers the last couple of years.

Beyond his health and non-pitcher status, Rasmus has a number of things working in his favor. Colby will be just 28 years old on Opening Day 2014, which would tie him with B.J. Upton as the youngest free agent to receive the Qualifying Offer. Additionally, he’s already displayed an elite-level peak. His 4.8 fWAR in 2013 places him in the company of Robinson Cano, Josh Hamilton, Jacoby Ellsbury, Shin-SooChoo, Michael Bourn, Curtis Granderson, and Mike Napoli as players who exceeded 4.5 fWAR in any of the three seasons leading up to their free agency. Finally, Rasmus plays an up-the-middle position (catcher, second base, shortstop, center field). Seven signed players met that criteria, and the average contract from that group was an astounding 6 years and 113 million. That is not a prediction of what he will make, merely a guarantee that barring a meteorically catastrophic 2014 season, Colby Rasmus will receive a Qualifying Offer from the Toronto Blue Jays, and he will decline it.

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In this guest post from Kyle Matte we get a look at the amazingness that is Edwin Encarnacion, and his remarkable transformation into one of the best hitters in the game. Follow Kyle on Twitter at @KyleMatte.

Back in July of 2009, the Toronto Blue Jays franchise was in a state of turmoil. Not only was the organization looking down the barrel of their first losing season since 2005, but the face of the roster – Roy Halladay – had made it known he was not interested in re-signing north of the border at the conclusion of his contract, which was set to expire following the 2010 season. It put then-General Manager J.P. Ricciardi in the unenviable position of attempting to trade one of the few true aces in baseball, and with a rotation that included Ricky Romero, Brian Tallet, and Scott Richmond, it was more than just a metaphorical white flag he’d be waving on competitive baseball for the foreseeable future.

To the surprise of no one, the market’s interest in Roy Halladay proved strong. While the Phillies were arguably the favorites all along, both teams in Los Angeles as well as the Texas Rangers reportedly got involved, causing a massive tide of attention from the national media. But come four-o’clock, Roy Halladay was still property of the Toronto Blue Jays. The big name who wasn’t? Scott Rolen. The Greatest Blue Jays of All Time was in the midst of a ferociously impressive season; 3.9 rWAR in just 88 games thanks to a .320/.376/.476 batting line and his usual spectacular defense, so when initial reports of the return began to surface, the airing of grievances began.

3:40 PM EDT: SI’s Jon Heyman says Rolen to the Reds… if he waives his NTC. But for what??? If it in any way Encarnacion I puke and disown this team immediately.

3:55 PM EDT: Puke! “The deal awaits only Rolen’s approval, which he is expected to give; he has a full no-trade clause. In return, the Jays will get third baseman Edwin Encarnacion and a minor leaguer,” says Fox. It better be a damn good minor leaguer.

That’s an excerpt from Drunk Jays Fans’ founder and Editor Andrew Stoeten’s trade deadline live blog. While hindsight is always a bitch, it’s hard to find fault with his immediate reaction. At the time of the trade, Encarnacion was struggling through an injury-marred season, and the 26 year old’s .209/.333/.374 slash line and negative 0.7 rWAR hardly inspired a whole lot of confidence moving forward. Even with solid-average offensive numbers for a corner infielder in the previous three years, park factors and his glorious defensive deficiencies significantly held back his overall value, limiting him to just 2.9 rWAR in the over 400 games since his rookie campaign. Cruel as it may be, there was merit behind his E5 moniker.

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(via, h/t to @theford)

Look familiar?

Yes, the Tumwater High School Baseball team, from Tumwater, Washington (about an hour south of Seattle), has taken the logo from those great Blue Jays teams of the early 2000s and made it their own. The Tumwater T-Birds might only be the 653rd best high school team in the nation, but they’ve easily become my favourite American high school baseball team.

And I don’t know about you, but if this 2014 Jays season falls apart in a hurry, I could see myself listening online to the local Tumwater radio station (KUOW 1340AM!) to see how the young men, wearing the most underrated Blue Jays logo, are doing. Rumour has it that Manager Jamie Weeks is coaching the boys up real nice in the fundamentals of the game and they could make a run at State. (follow Mr. Weeks on Twitter!)

Now, knowing the Blue Jays keen sense of public perception, they’ll probably sue the hell out of the Tumwater T-Birds. Shutting down, not only the baseball program, but the entire school of Tumwater. Parents, balking at the cost of shipping their kids to Olympia for schooling, will move their families out of Tumwater. Essentially turning the once vibrant baseball town into a shell of its former self.

OR, you know, the Jays could make up for the annoying begging that has been their twitter account pushing the #FaceOfMLB and do something fun like donate a bunch of the old Jays T-Bird gear to these kids. Which would ACTUALLY be doing something for a good cause.

The T-Birds Honda Home Opener is March 12th. State! State! State!

Thanks to Dave Burrows for the post. I repeat, this is a guest post.


In this guest post from Kyle Matte, we’re treated to an historical review of the Jays’ top prospects, with the hope of divining some meaning from the fact that Aaron Sanchez now holds that spot. You can view some of the data Kyle discusses here in this Google Document. Follow Kyle on Twitter at @KyleMatte.

Baseball America has been around for a very long time, having been founded by Canadian Allan Simpson way back in 1980. In 1983, it was purchased by the owner of the Durham Bulls minor league franchise, and moved to Durham, North Carolina. It was then, in 1983, that the publication began their organizational top ten prospect reports. While I don’t necessarily agree with their rankings or their methodology of the rankings itself (they rely greatly upon team sources for the organizational reports, whereas other publications, like Baseball Prospectus, primarily utilize sources from outside the organization, as well as their own eyes, to avoid bias), it speaks volumes that they have been churning out content every year since. It affords us a rare opportunity to have over thirty years of organizational prospect rankings to reflect on, and I’ve taken advantage of this information in an attempt to uncover what exactly it means to be the Toronto Blue Jays number one prospect, as Aaron Sanchez was named for 2014 this past December.

What has our overall success rate been with #1 prospects? What level of Major League production did those players generate over their careers? How have we fared with pitchers versus hitters? I was able to answer all of these questions and more, and before the end I’ll offer a glimpse into the career Aaron Sanchez might have, if he develops like the average number one Blue Jays prospect.

As mentioned above, the first Blue Jays organizational report was released in anticipation of the 1983 season, so that will be the starting point for this exercise. For an end point, I settled on 2009. It’s not arbitrary – as the rankings are released prior to the season, ending the analysis in 2009 would supply us with five years of data from which to analyze that final number one prospect. If you wished to stretch the list to 2010 to include Zach Stewart who is most assuredly a bust, I could see your justification, but I felt five years was the bare minimum from which to fairly judge a professional career.

These parameters offer us 27 years of top ten rankings, on which 18 different names appear at the top. Five prospects rank number one twice, while two players repeat at the top thrice (and man, did they ever have different careers). The split is skewed heavily towards positional players, as of the 18, only 3 are pitchers, interestingly, all of whom are right handed. The Blue Jays have never had a left-handed pitcher rank number one.

I investigated a variety of factors in hopes of best encapsulating a professional career within one line of a spreadsheet. I looked at the year in which they played their first full MLB season (a designation loosely based around a minimum of 300 plate appearances for hitters, 100 innings pitched for starting pitchers, and 30 innings pitched for relievers, though exceptions were made), how many years after their number one ranking they achieved that first full season – which I termed the “lag” – and how old they were in that season. Using the value figures calculated by Fangraphs, I inspected the WAR they created in their first, second, and third full MLB seasons separately, as well as cumulatively. In addition to their career WAR, I also designated each player’s peak years – where I felt they performed at their highest level – and looked at how much value they produced over that specified time period. Finally, using the first year of the peak window and their first full MLB season, I was able to determine how many seasons of development at the Major League level it took for the prospect to begin playing at their best.

Because of the inclusion of players whose careers are still on-going, some of the averaged numbers, namely the career WAR, are being artificially held down. For this reason, when it comes to projecting the completely hypothetical career for Aaron Sanchez in the latter half of this article, I’ll only use the WAR for players who have officially retired (and Vernon Wells, because, come on Vernon, it’s over).

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