Alen Dumonjic

After a 1-15 season under head coach Jim Caldwell, the Indianapolis Colts cleaned house and started a new era by hiring former Baltimore Ravens defensive coordinator Chuck Pagano, who brought in former rival Pittsburgh Steelers offensive coordinator Bruce Arians. Arians brings over a very interesting offensive philosophy since he’s adept at putting together a run heavy or pass heavy game-plan, and he’s able to do both out of multiple formations.

The multiple formations of Arians’ offense is the topic for today because there’s more to it than simple alignments. The movements and alignments cause a reaction in defensive backfields, and often that leads to confusion. The three formation sets that will be looked at are empty, bunch, and stacked.

Arians’ empty set is no different than what’s currently seen around the NFL. As teams continue to use spread passing principles on the field and implement it into their playbooks, they’re using the width of the field by spreading their receivers wider and wider. When they do this, they have the opportunity to not only stretch defenses horizontally but vertically as well, which is something that Arians does effectively.

He spreads defenses horizontally through initial spacing, and then after the snap he combines horizontal and vertical routes that stretch the secondary. When this is done, nearly all zone coverages, depending on what one classifies as zone, turn into man coverage. That puts a pass defender in trail position, and consequently at a disadvantage.

Spread formation.

The spread formation is what nearly every team utilizes nowadays, and offenses will continue to do so as they expand on it. But what Arians has also done a very good job of is creating space and free releases for his receivers by cutting down the width of their alignments.

An example of this is Arians’ offense coming out in a spread formation with four receivers and one tailback split-out and then shifting the tailback into the backfield while the three receivers to one side (spread formations are 3×2 sets) will bunch together to form a Trips Bunch set.

Trips Bunch.

The Trips Bunch set complicates the assignments for defenders. The opposition is forced to make checks in their coverage which usually “bases” them out, causing them to play simple coverages that play into the hands of the decision maker: the quarterback. This will benefit Andrew Luck because he’ll have simpler reads as a rookie because of Arians’ motion and bunched sets.

There’s also a single receiver on the line to the strong side of the formation (bottom of the image), while two are off the line of scrimmage. The two receivers off the line of scrimmage benefit from this alignment because they’re unable to be pressed at the snap. What usually occurs is the defense will press or jam the receiver on the line to disrupt the rhythm and timing of the offense. However, the two receivers off the line of scrimmage still have free releases (as you can see with DB #24 in loose coverage) that enable them to develop into their routes.

The last formation that I want to touch upon is the  Twins set that Arians often marches out. This formation once again consists of four pass catchers and one running back who is in the backfield. There are two pass catchers to each side of the formation, which again creates a free release off the line of scrimmage for a receiver.

There’s different ways to align in this formation, but the outside receivers on this play are the ones who get the free release.

Twins set.

The three formations I picked out of Arians’ playbook are the ones that I’ve seen him use often simply due to their continued effectiveness.

During his time with the Steelers, Arians utilized an abundance of pass concepts that stretched defenses horizontally, such as the “Hi-Lo” concept that puts a single defender in conflict with two pass catchers running routes to the same area at different depths. This is similar in some ways to what the Colts did during the Peyton Manning years, except that Arians’ sets are more multiple. Arians will throw various looks and concepts at defenses to keep them off-balance and confused.

It’s been a tumultuous off-season for the New Orleans Saints to say the least. A bounty scandal rocked the franchise leading to multiple suspensions – most notably middle linebacker Jonathan Vilma and former defensive coordinator Gregg Williams – and costly fines. However, in the midst of all the negativity, there was one significant positive: hiring former St. Louis Rams head coach Steve Spagnuolo as the new defensive coordinator. Spagnuolo is a very aggressive defensive mastermind whose defensive concepts, such as “sugaring” the interior gaps, can be traced back to his mentor, the late Jim Johnson.

Under the guidance of former defensive coordinator Gregg Williams last season, the Saints defense had many issues including lack of discipline and blown coverages. Perhaps the defensive problems can be traced back to the bounties, regardless,  the defense will likely be more disciplined and just as aggressive under Spagnuolo.

Spagnuolo does not hesitate to send pressure packages, which are often successful. The reason for this success is because of his great understanding of the opponent’s blocking schemes. Spagnuolo understands that if he moves one chess piece, the offense will react. If he moves multiple ones, there will more reaction, which means a likelier chance of it breaking down.

An example of one of Spanguolo’s pressure packages is the Fire Zone blitz, which is a common 5 man blitz with 6 defenders dropping in what is often 3 underneath and 3 deep or 4 underneath and 2 deep coverage, that came against division rival San Francisco 49ers last season.

Before the snap, defensive back Darian Stewart and linebacker James Laurinaitis were aligned in a two-point stance in the A (area between center and left guard) and B (area between right guard and tackle) gaps showing pressure. These two alignments are crucial in this pressure package because it tightens the interior pass protection of the offensive line due to them having to account for the two potential blitzing defenders.

Steve Spagnuolo's Fire Zone Blitz

Another key aspect of this defensive front was the alignment of the defensive linemen. The two ends were aligned in loose 5 techniques while the defensive tackle (left) aligned in a shaded 4 technique, which puts the 49ers left tackle in conflict. His assignments come in question now because although he’s taught to block inside-out, the defensive end would have a clean path to the quarterback for a sack if left unblocked.

Furthermore, the Rams nose tackle is in a 1 technique across the center and is threatening the near gap while a defensive back that’s to the right edge of the image is another blitzing defender that is unaccounted for at the moment.

At the snap of the ball, the 49ers 6-man protection is in for a surprise, particularly on the left side of the line. The defensive end (left) drops into coverage while the defensive tackle (shaded 4 technique) and nose tackle (1 technique) “long-sticking” to the left of the image, leaving left guard Mike Iupati with no one to block, and defensive back Brian Stewart, who was in the A gap, aggressively pursues after 49ers quarterback Alex Smith.

It's off to the races!

Because of the confusion created on the left side of the offensive line, the Rams are able to get matchup advantages with two defensive linemen long-sticking and a defensive back blitzing downhill. Because Iupati is confused by his assignment, he doesn’t block anyone, thus creating essentially a 3-on-2 matchup for the Rams that leads to a sack of Smith.

Smith is sacked by A-gap blitzer Darian Stewart.

Another sack that worked out just the way Spagnuolo drew it up came against Drew Brees and the Saints. The focus is once again on the left side of the opponent’s offensive line, which is outnumbered by the defenders of the creative blitz scheme after the snap despite it looking like the contrary prior to the snap.

The left of the Saints pass protection appears to have a numbers advantage with 3 blockers (left tackle, left guard and tailback; the tight end motions out) against 2 Rams defenders, a 5 technique defensive end and a 2-gap linebacker. However, the defensive back at the top of the image is unaccounted for and creates a free path for the middle linebacker (bold yellow line) to get the sack on Brees.

The offensive line initially appears to have the numbers advantage but not so...

At the snap, the defensive end to the left of the offensive tackle drives upfield as a C-gap speed rusher to widen out the blocker and create a gap between the tackle and guard. When this gap is created, the defensive back that was at the top of the image comes into the gap and occupies the running back, who is assigned pass protection duties.

Moreover, the nose tackle (1 technique) once again long-sticks to the opposite gap like he did in the blitz against the 49ers and in the process, occupies the left guard. When this is done, it creates a massive gap between the tackle and guard that is filled quickly by the blitzing linebacker, who picks up the sack.

And a sack it is.

The pressure package is a brilliantly designed one by Spagnuolo, who took advantage of the man blocking scheme of the Saints protection and turned it against them. He widened the blockers to create a free path for the last blitzing defender, the middle linebacker. This is one of multiple pressure packages that Spagnuolo has, many of which include defensive backs coming downhill in nickel and dime packages as witnessed in these two examples.

One thing’s for sure, the Saints will be getting after quarterbacks this season and it will be for the right reasons.

Four years ago, Tony Sparano roamed the sideline in week 17  against the Jets as the head coach of the Miami Dolphins. It was his first season as the head coach and it was a mightily successful one, as he won the AFC East division crown in New Jersey. However, after three below average seasons the Bill Parcells protege is back roaming the sidelines in New Jersey – this time as the Jets offensive coordinator.

Sparano teams up with former division rival Rex Ryan to improve what was a porous offensive display the past few seasons under Brian Schottenheimer. Schottenheimer was a stale play-caller that  lacked imagination and the ability to make in-game adjustments.  As a consequence the Jets  defense was consistently at a disadvantage despite providing quality performances from their side of the ball.

Unfortunately for Jets fans, Sparano is cut from a similar cloth, as his offenses in Miami were similarly vanilla and struggled to play with any consistency on Sunday’s.

The offense was based on ball control with the running game out of 21 (2 backs, 1 tight end) or 12 (1 back, 2 tight ends) personnel while also using a plethora of horizontal routes that stretched the defense the width of the field and gave quarterback Chad Henne, who was still developing at the time as a passer, progressions to read through and find the open receiver. This led to a lot of 2-man combination routes as well as mirrored route concepts that were simple reads for the quarterback.

An example of this is the Levels concept that was popularly ran by Miami during his time there. This play creates a Hi-Lo read for the quarterback when two receivers run the similar routes, square-in’s, at different depths toward the middle of the field, consequently putting the play-side linebacker in a difficult situation. The quarterback throws it to the open receiver that is dictated by the reaction by the linebacker, who either comes up to cover the underneath square-in ran by the outside receiver or drops deeper to cover the square-in over the top that’s ran by the inside receiver.

Image courtesy of Smartfootball.com.

While the horizontal pass routes, such as the aforementioned Levels, were the go-to concepts, the offense also featured a few vertical stretches that put pressure on the defense on one side of the field.

An example of this type of concept is Smash. The Smash concept is a 2-man route combination that puts stress on a single defensive back.

Smash concept.

Typically seen used with success against Cover 2 (five-under, two-deep zone) that has a cornerback defending the flats, the Smash concept requires the outside flanker receiver (1) run a Hitch route while the inside slot receiver or tight end (2) runs a Corner route that is typically broken off at about 18 yards and is ran to 22 yards deep.

Because the defensive back is a flat defender, he is put in a bind when the two routes are ran outside the numbers to one side of the field. The concept serves as a “Hi-Lo” concept, as it’s called in football parlance, because it has a pass catcher in front (“Lo”) of cornerback as well as behind him (“Hi”), thus forcing him to choose which one to cover. Subsequently, the quarterback throws it to the open one and has a completion.

This concept is very popular throughout the league because it’s a simplified read for the quarterback and creates a numbers advantage for the offense by having two pass targets in one area against a single defender.

While Sparano’s offense does utilize complementary run and pass concepts, it struggles to adjust when defenses start to sit on the routes. The key for Sparano and the Jets offense is the in-game adjustments that they’ll have to make to counter defenses. Sparano must do a better job of controlling the offense and making adjustments that enable the team to succeed in the second half of games as well as in situational football, which his offenses in Miami consistently struggled with.

Once upon a time, prospects without a true position were considered jacks of all trades, or in scouting parlance, “tweeners,” and were knocked down draft boards. However, in today’s game, players of this kind are no longer simply tweeners, and instead they’re “versatile,” and their stocks are raised. Melvin Ingram, who the San Diego Chargers selected eighteenth overall in the draft, is a prime example.

Ingram played nearly every position in the front seven during his time at South Carolina, starting with his “natural” (I use this term loosely) defensive end position, and sliding in to 3 technique under tackle as well as standing up as an outside linebacker. This led to Ingram creating matchup advantages as he ripped through heavy-legged, waist bending guards on the interior.

His explosiveness off the line of scrimmage and outstanding lateral agility enabled him to administer several pass rush moves against interior linemen, who typically have issues in pass protection which is why they’re on the inside. Ingram has a deadly inside spin move that he uses as a counter move off of his speed rush, which is also very dangerous because of his elite quickness.

This explosiveness and schematic versatility will translate over to the NFL because San Diego plays hybrid fronts. The Chargers operate out of a base 30 front defense, which has 3 down linemen and typically 4 linebackers unless the team is going to a sub-package, such as a nickel or dime, which defenses are spending over sixty percent of their snaps a year in.

In their 30 front, Ingram is likely to serve as “ghost” 5 technique, which in layman terms translates to outside linebacker. Ingram’s explosiveness and quickness off the edge can be problematic for offensive tackles, especially since he has a shorter stature. That enables him to have a natural leverage advantage and dip his shoulder to take a shorter path to the quarterback in a pass rushing style similar to Bruce Irvin’s approach.

There’s also the possibility that the Chargers use him as an inside linebacker. This doesn’t seem like the ideal scenario, but in certain packages it can be because he’s able to do damage downhill. Ingram can be used as a blitzing defender, doing damage against slower interior blockers because of his elite quickness and explosiveness.

While he would be playing in a two-point stance in the Chargers 3-4 front, he’s unlikely to spend as much time doing so in their 4-3 front. If Ingram was to play in a two point stance in the Chargers four-man front, he’d likely be a weak-side linebacker. The reason for this is because he would be protected up front by the under tackle (3-technique), which is beneficial for him because he has shorter arms and thus has a more difficult time stacking and shedding blockers.

However, it’s likely that when the defense goes to a four-man front on passing downs, as they did last season, Ingram will spend the majority of his snaps as a 5-technique defensive end or a 3-technique under tackle, with  most of his damage coming from the interior role as it did in college.

This is was seen against Clemson last season, when Ingram lined up on the interior across from the left guard.

Ingram on the interior.

He proved to be too quick-handed for the blocker, as he was able to gain the leverage advantage and force the blocker to lunge at him.

The blocker lunges, bending at the waist, in an attempt to deal with Ingram.

Once he was able to execute an arm over move to get past the blocker, he had a clear path to the quarterback and the blocker was unable to slow him down because Ingram had gained leverage.

The left guard can't deal with Ingram's quickness.

Ingram as a 3-technique in San Diego would pose the same problems for blockers in the NFL because they also struggle while dealing with rushers that have explosive first steps. Ingram is able to jolt blockers back at the point of attack, consequently establishing a new line of scrimmage and then working his way into the pocket with his speed, dangerous quickness or power.

I expect Ingram to be very dangerous for the Chargers if they use him correctly. He’s not the type of player who’s likely to succeed in simply one role, and instead he should be moved around like a chess piece in order to create mismatches for the defense.

I sat with the rest of the coaching staff in the office at a high school practice when a tall, dark man came into the room and introduced himself as a scout for the West Virginia Mountaineers. He was there to watch practice and catch a glimpse of one of the school’s offensive linemen.

Prior to heading out to practice, he briefly discussed the Mountaineers squad and was quickly asked by one of the defensive coaches about a defensive end named Bruce Irvin. Irvin had just came off an eye-popping 14-sack season in his first year at West Virginia and he was ready to be unleashed once again for the 2011 campaign. The scout, smiling ear-to-ear, said the team was going to “widen” Irvin in their 30 front and have him wreak havoc as a speed rusher off the edge. His senior season would result in a dip to eight sacks from the 14 in his junior year because of teams altering their pass protections in his direction, but he was still applying pressure.

Months later, one of the biggest shocks in the first round of the 2012 NFL draft was the fifteenth overall selection made by the Seattle Seahawks, who selected Irvin. A dynamic yet troubled athlete, Irvin had shockingly gone from little experience (two years) at a high level of collegiate play to being a first-round NFL draft choice. But it all made sense to the Seahawks, who run a 4-3 Under front.

Image courtesy of http://trojanfootballanalysis.com

The 4-3 Under front, as explained by Pete Carroll at a coaching clinic, has a weak-side pass rusher (right “DE” on image above) known as the “Elephant” or in Carroll’s terminology, “Leo“. This defender is a hybrid defensive end and outside linebacker that aligns away from the strength of the formation, typically defined by the tight end, and is strictly a C gap (outside the tackle) run defender that’s also simply asked to raise hell off the edge.

That’s what Irvin does best.

And if there’s one thing quality coaches do, it’s finding the strengths of a player and plugging him into the correct scheme to maximize his success. Irvin excels at getting around the edge and applying pressure on quarterbacks. He has surprising strength, which can be fascinatingly on display when he’s administering a bulrush with his 6’2″, 245-pound frame on a massive, heavy-legged pass blocker on the edge.

But he also has good stop-start ability which enables him to transition from an outside speed rush to an inside move, which if developed and done with consistency can be very deadly.

The outside speed rush, at the moment, is his go-to move. He hasn’t developed many pass rush moves that can be used with consistency, but he can develop them. If he can establish a counter move off of his go-to speed rush, he can be a terror off the edge for the Seahawks because in my opinion, all you really need are two moves: the aforementioned go-to, and counter moves.

However, in the meantime, Irvin’s speed rush has proven to be very deadly. If this is his only move, why is it so successful? Because of his explosiveness off the line of scrimmage and his ability to dip his shoulder.

Take for instance his quickness against the Maryland right tackle in the image below.

Irvin's already got a step on the blocker.

The right tackle hasn’t even executed his kick-slide to get into his set before Irvin’s already crossed the line of scrimmage after getting up from his stance. This is problematic for the blocker because he’s at a disadvantage and is forced to open his hips up, which distorts his footwork and potentially causes him to be unbalanced while turning to ride Irvin wide of the pocket. However, he’s still not quick enough to adjust, and Irvin now has a clear path into the backfield and to the quarterback.

Irvin now dips his shoulder, creating a leverage advantage in his favor, and he takes a shorter path to the quarterback.

Irvin dips his shoulder and gets after the quarterback.

The play results in a sack and stops the offense from extending the drive and potentially getting seven points. Instead, they are forced to settle for three, which is a significant aspect of defensive red zone efficiency. This blistering speed off the edge that Irvin possesses is going to cause problems for pass blockers at the NFL level as well; the question simply is, how effective will Irvin be?

If Irvin develops a go-to and counter move, he could potentially be a dangerous “Leo” in Carroll’s 4-3 Under front.

Last season, the San Francisco 49ers offense had to manufacture big, explosive plays (which are accurately categorized as 16 yards or more) in the passing game through schematic design and heavy reliance on tight end Vernon Davis. Once teams started to bracket Davis, who often would do his work in the seam, the offense was hamstrung by the lack of an outside vertical threat that could take advantage of the extra attention paid to the star TE.

Because of that, general manager Trent Baalke and head coach Jim Harbaugh went into the off-season seeking playmakers, and getting them by signing Mario Manningham, who’s coming off a signature Superbowl catch, and Randy Moss, who came out of retirement. However, both targets are not entirely reliable as Manningham has a tendency to drop passes, while Moss plays whenever he damn well feels like it.

Enter A.J. Jenkins.

The 49ers selected the Illinois wide receiver with their 30th overall last week much to the surprise of many, most notably ESPN draft expert Mel Kiper, who expected the prospect to go a full 24 hours later. However, what the 49ers brass saw was the added dimension he brought to an offensive scheme that does an exceptional job of getting its players running in space — the big play threat.

In college, Jenkins came from an offense where he showed his versatility and was used in many ways that he’ll be used in San Francisco. He lined up outside and inside, which gives the 49ers more options with him in their offense. He also ran a significant amount of slants, which can be seen in the 49ers offense, and crossing routes, which amount to horizontal stretches.

These crossing routes came in many forms, most notably shallow crosses in the “Mesh” concept that saw Jenkins come across the formation at a depth of roughly five-to-six yards, giving him the opportunity to do damage after the catch — something he does well.

However, while these types of routes are common in college as many offenses use some spin-off of the “spread” offense, Jenkins was not limited to them. He also showed the ability to win one-on-one battles vertically against defensive backs for a big catch, as witnessed against Northwestern last season.

Early into the 4th quarter with Illinois trailing by five, Jenkins and his teammates came to the line on second down, and they needed either yards. Jenkins, whose aligned inside as the slot receiver to the Field (wide) side, was preparing to run what’s called a “Post-Corner” route while on the outside, and his teammate would run a “Go” route that served as a clear-out for Jenkins.

Jenkins aligns in the slot.

At the snap Jenkins burst off the line, and after a seven-yard vertical stem, he planted his outside foot and broke to the inside on what initially looked like a Post route.

Jenkins plants his outside foot and drives inside on what appears to be a Post route.

After driving to the inside on what looked like an inside-breaking route, Jenkins planted his inside foot, shifted his shoulders and drove to the outside, leaving the deep safety coming downhill to attack a ball that was not going to be thrown.

Jenkins drives outside while the safety drives inside.

This execution showed the Jenkins’ potential on a single play, displaying his versatility to align inside while also showing the ability to run routes with a high degree of difficulty that require attention to detail (i.e. footwork, shoulders) while also coming up with the big play.

Jenkins hauls in the pass.

The 49ers surprised many when they selected Jenkins in the first round because of the other names on the board, such as Stephen Hill of Georgia Tech and Rueben Randle of LSU. However, while those two prospects are also very talented, Jenkins fits the offense in San Francisco better.

He is quick-footed, tough, has big hands that enable him to snatch passes of all sorts, possesses the body control to adjust to misplaced passes, the long speed to do damage vertically, and he’s versatile in his alignments.

All these characteristics made him worthy of a first-round selection, and they could lead to him being one of the most productive receivers in the 2012 draft class.

The three-day NFL draft extravaganza has concluded and culminated in many draftniks and experts furiously flipping through their draft guides while yelling “reach!” on draftees that went higher than expected. One of those “reaches” may have been new Kansas City Chiefs nose tackle Dontari Poe, a plus sized yet ultra athletic prospect whose stock seemed to be in question at times.

Poe was taken No. 11 overall by the red and white, and it was immediately an intriguing selection due to several reasons that apply to the draft strategy and philosophy of Scott Pioli. The Chiefs GM has a history of working with the famous (or infamous, depending on the color of your glasses) Bill Belichick, who learned from the George Young school of drafting.

George Young and the Planet Theory Concept

George Young was a long-time New York Giants general manager who significantly influenced the majority of the personnel men in the NFL today. One of the concepts he introduced was “planet theory,” which stated that there were only so many men of great size and athletic ability walking planet earth, thus when presented with an opportunity acquire one, a GM should pounce.

This concept applies to Poe. Pioli said that “if you watch tape, you can see that this guy is a strong player, he’s a thick player, and he’s a tremendous athlete.”  At the Combine, Poe came in at a massive 6’4 1/8″ and 346 pounds while also running a 4.98 in the 40-yard dash and putting up a jaw-dropping 44 reps of 225 pounds.  On tape, he showed explosiveness to go along with impressive agility, which is uncommon for a player of his size.

Schematic Fit

But the planet theory concept is not the only thing that Pioli has applied to his draft strategy. There’s also the task of finding the right players to fit the scheme in use. This is a part of every general manager’s draft plans as explained by current New England Patriots pro personnel director Jason Licht, who spent time working with Pioli when the two were together with the Patriots.

Licht briefly stated that “it’s not always about finding the best talent, it’s about finding the right pieces,” when noting that the Patriots had 18 undrafted players on their roster.

When the Chiefs selected Poe, they identified him as the “right piece” for their 3-4 scheme, which is based out of an Okie front and also features a reduced front.

The 3-4 Okie front (pictured below) has been a staple of Romeo Crennel’s defense, and it features a 0 technique (head-up on center) nose tackle, which a technique that Poe has little experience playing.

Poe played a lot of 3 technique (outside shoulder of either guard) at Memphis, which requires of him to be a penetrating tackle and push the pocket from the inside. However, in the 0 technique alignment, Poe’s predecessor Kelly Gregg was often responsible for both A gaps (located between center and each guard), thus serving as a 2-gap nose tackle. Although he did it at times in college, he did not do it a lot and is already raw in his abilities.

In his press conference, Pioli further explained his draft selection.

“Now you’ve also got a player that will maybe line up on the same side as Tamba, who is creating a real threat and having to take up bodies,” he said.

The quote implies that there is a chance the Chiefs will move Poe around on the defensive line to ease his transition as well as eat up blocks to create favorable matchups for pass rusher Tamba Hali. What this could mean is that when the Chiefs go to their reduced front, Poe may not be a 0 (or 1) technique that simply eats up blocks, and instead he has a chance to be given the freedom to charge a single gap and attempt to apply pressure into the backfield from a 3 (or even 5) technique alignment — which he worked from a lot in college.

Moving Forward

One thing that’s common from NFL defenses in today’s game is sub-packages such as 30 and 40 nickel and dime fronts, which means there are 3 (30) or 4 (40) down linemen and 5 (nickel) or 6 (dime) defensive backs.

The reason this is common is because offenses are spreading defenses out and forcing them to cover more ground, which not all linebackers can do, as well as spreading them out to run, which the Chiefs had trouble with last season.

Pioli also explained KC’s diffiulties defending on the ground.

“You have to force a player on your inside to play the run in sub-package sets, which was a problem for us last year.”

However, with a wider body that has the stamina to play more snaps, hold up against the run, and still apply pressure on passing downs, it becomes easier for the Chiefs to go to their sub-packages, which is why Poe made sense for the Chiefs at 11.

Poe still has a lot to work to do in terms of developing hand use and playing with leverage, which may lead to a rough time for the Chiefs defense initially when he’s out there. But those skills can be coached, and the Chiefs have done a good job of developing their defensive linemen, meaning Poe will be eased into his role as he grows.

One thing’s for sure, though, he has the raw talent to develop into a dominant defensive linemen.